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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how civil society organisations (CSOs) can create an arena for 
peacebuilding in Lebanon. The aim of the thesis is to discuss how civil society can play an 
important role in a post-civil war perspective. The thesis is a case study of Lebanon, 25 years 
after the bloody civil war from 1975-1989. The thesis is grounded in interviews with 
representatives from five different CSOs. The empirical data is analysed on the background 
of conflict resolution and conflict transformation theories and an understanding of 
peacebuilding as sustainable peace. Furthermore the thesis apply theory on the role of the 
civil society in peacebuilding and which powers CSOs can apply in order to obtain influence 
in the peacebuilding process. The thesis argues that in order to create an arena for 
peacebuilding the CSOs need to provide a function and through that function obtain influence 
at all levels of society. We conclude that the political system in Lebanon works against the 
CSOs effort to create a sustainable peace. The CSOs can meet this challenge if they manage 
to incorporate their powers strategically in their functions to reach all levels of society. Only 
in this way can the CSOs create an arena for peacebuilding in Lebanon. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Problem Area 
For a while, it seemed like the 21th Century would turn out more peaceful than its 
predecessor. The decline in great power conflicts the end of the cold war and the closer 
regional cooperation, most significantly in Europe, looked like it might pave the way for a 
safer world. It did not quite turn out that way, and the world today is as conflictual as ever. 
What has changed is the type of wars and where they are led. Where interstate wars used to 
be the dominant type, there has been a significant increase in the frequency of intrastate wars, 
especially in the Global South (Levy 2007: 18). These contemporary wars are often described 
as ethnic or identity wars, as they evolve around internal cleavages between ethnicity, clans 
and religions (Lederach 1997: 13). Although defined as civil wars or intrastate wars, these 
conflicts usually involve regional and international actors as well, and the conflicts quickly 
become internationalised, when weapons, money and refugees pass borders. Another 
important notion of civil wars, besides being ethnic or identity based, is that a lot of these 
wars are also based on socio-economic cleavages (Ibid.). All of these characteristics can 
largely be applied to the Lebanese civil war - an intrastate war between 18 different 
confessional communities, which lasted from 1975 to 1990 and resulted in more than 144.000 
killings, 184.000 injured and a displacement of over 750.000 Lebanese citizens (Ghosn and 
Khoury 2011: 382). Furthermore, the Lebanese civil war quickly became regionalised, when 
both Syria and Israel got involved in it (Zahar 2012: 66). The civil war was a reaction to both 
regional problems related to the Israel-Palestine conflict and the high number of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, as well as internal problems related to the confessional system1 that had 
governed the state since its independence in 1943. More specifically this system was built on 
the demographic composition of Lebanon and distributed the governmental power after a six 
Christians to five Muslims ratio. Problems arose when the demographic changes was not 
followed by a change in the distribution of power (Ghosn and Khoury 2011: 382). The 15 
years of Lebanese civil war was extremely violent and bloody, and introduced the use of 
Islamic suicide bombs, kidnappings of western citizens and horrible massacres of civilians, 
which has been seen in many of the Middle Eastern conflicts since. It is especially the ethnic 
or sectarian character of the civil war that has influenced the Middle East negatively with an 
enlarged focus on Shia-Sunni relations and an increase in the number of fleeing Christian 
                                                 
1 Confessionalism is a specific form of consociationalism, where the political and institutional power 
of the government is distributed after the religious sub-communities (CJPME 2007: 1).  
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minorities (Rubin 12.04.2015).  
The Lebanese conflict went through a number of phases and failures of mediation attempts 
before moving towards an internal agreement, when the surviving parliament of 1972 met 
around the negotiation table in late the 1980s in the Saudi Arabian city Ta’if. The peace 
agreement, also known as the Ta’if Accord, was signed in 1989 and withheld a reform of the 
existing political system, granting the Muslims a bigger role in the political process (Ghosn 
and Khoury 2011: 383-384). Furthermore, the Ta’if Accord brought with it a comprehensive 
amnesty, officially pardoning all war crimes and thereby allowing former war lords to join 
the parliament. The amnesty has been highly criticised because it did not allow the Lebanese 
to achieve reconciliation through a just trial and an open public debate, and it has contributed 
to what has been called a “state-sponsored amnesia” (Haugbølle, 2012: 15; Ghosn and 
Khoury 2011: 392). Hope was that the “state sponsored amnesia” would only be a temporary 
condition for ending hostility and thus clearing the path for a long-term national peace 
building process (Safa 2007: 6). The Ta’if Accord called for a gradual abolition of the 
confessional system as well as for a withdrawal of all foreign forces, though, neither the 
confessional system was replaced with secularism as promised, nor did the Israeli and Syrian 
forces withdraw until 10-15 years after the Ta’if Accord in respectively 2000 and 2005 
(Ghosn and Khoury 2011: 384). In the post-conflict phase, the government fell short in their 
attempt to handle both economic and political challenges, but also the social, psychological 
and physical impacts of the civil war (Ibid: 385). The Lebanese citizens still move within 
their respective sectarian communities i.e. their neighbourhoods, associations, schools and 
media, which is a major challenge for the process of peace building (Haugbølle 2012: 15-17). 
The end of the civil war saw the rise of many civil society organisations that tried to address 
these questions of reconciliation and cohesion among the different sectarian groups (el-Masri 
2009: 269-273). In the theoretical approaches to peace building, the civil society has 
developed from playing a relatively marginal role during the Cold War to being an accepted 
key actor. Though many scholars agree, that national actors and civil society need to play a 
more leading role, and that external actors should play a much more limited role in regards to 
peace building, still there seems to be a knowledge gap, when it comes to actually 
investigating and theorising how this is done (Paffenholz 2010: 61). Lebanon is in relation to 
other Arab countries considered to host public space and potential for civil society, which is 
reflected in the high number of registered CSOs compared to the population size (Safa 2007: 
3). Despite the fact that many of these CSOs focus their work on reconciliation and peace, the 
interethnic conflicts between Lebanese citizens are not anywhere near a solution (el-Masri 
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2009: 269-273). Thereby there exists an interesting gap between theory and reality in the case 
of Lebanon. A country with a big civil society, in a post-conflict setting still facing 
challenges with the process of peace building more than 25 years after the peace-agreement. 
Our main interest and focus for this project is therefore to examine how the civil society 
organisations actually can have an influence on building peace in Lebanon.   
 
1.2 Problem Formulation  
How can CSOs create an arena for peace building in Lebanon?  
 
Research Questions 
1. In which context does CSOs operate? 
2. Which functions, related to the context, does CSOs provide in the process of peace 
building? 
3. In what ways, can CSO’s, through these functions, obtain influence in the peace building 
process? 
 
1.3 Concept Clarification 
Civil Society Organisations 
Christoph Spurk defines Civil Society as: “Consist[ing] of a large and diverse set of voluntary 
organisations - competing with each other and orientated to specific interests - that are not 
purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organised, and interact in 
the public sphere.” (Spurk 2010: 9). Furthermore, civil society is distinct from the state, 
political, private and economic sectors, though sometimes the boundaries between these 
sectors are complex and blurred (Ibid.). We use Spurk’s definition, but in this thesis it only 
includes Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). More specifically, it only includes CSOs 
working with peace building in Lebanon, through a focus on intergroup and religious 
coexistence, reconciliation, equal citizenship and social cohesion.  
 
Peace Building 
In this thesis, peace building is conceptualised after the definition of sustainable peace, 
merged between the ideas of the conflict transformation school and the conflict resolution 
school. Sustainable peace is a positive peace with a wide time frame (Paffenholz 2010: 46-
54). In order to build a sustainable peace, long-term antagonists need to achieve 
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reconciliation, thus addressing and solving the root causes of the conflict (Lederach 1997: 
26). Furthermore, we define the process of peace building as something, which can only 
happen through an active inclusion of all levels of society (Lederach 1997). Moreover, this 
definition of peace building adds to conflict management by highlighting the need to think 
long-term strategies into solving conflicts.  
 
Arena 
In this thesis, arena is defined as what the CSOs create when functions are merged with 
influence. To create an arena for peace building in this definition, the CSO has to take on 
functions of peace building as well as be able to obtain influence with these functions. In 
relation to this, functions are defined after Tania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk’s (2010) 
seven kinds of CSO functions, and influence is defined by Pamela Aall’s (2007) definition of 
nonofficial organisation’s powers in conflict management and John P. Leaderach’s (1997) 
middle-range power theory.  
 
1.4 Delimitation 
This thesis is focused on the contemporary Lebanese post-conflict situation. Previous events 
and developments will only be examined, when relevant for the CSOs’ possibilities for peace 
building in the current situation. This thesis focus on CSOs and their actions in relation to 
peace building, thus the examination of other important actors and their actions in the peace 
building process is delimited. Internal actors as the state, Hezbollah, the religious 
communities and the political parties are only included when relevant for the CSOs’ actions. 
Similarly, the external actors as the regional alliances and international society are only 
included to explain how the contemporary global situation affects the CSOs’ work in 
Lebanon. Thus, we delimit ourselves from examining how both internal and external actors 
could contribute to the creation of an arena for peace building in Lebanon. The thesis focus 
on the CSOs actions, thus a deeper examination of other causal explanations such as the 
CSOs’ economy, history of work and specific relations with other CSOs or with political or 
religious communities, is delimited. Furthermore, a big part of the Lebanese civil society is 
delimited, because we only focus on CSOs who work with peace building. The analytical 
framework of the thesis is based on a causal explanation i.e. functions + influence → arena, 
even though we are fully aware that other factors could be a part of creating an arena for 
peace building. However, due to our focus on the actions of CSOs, we delimit the thesis from 
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those other factors. An important delimitation in our thesis is the fact that, while we try to 
understand how CSOs can have influence on the peace building process, we do not measure 
the quantitative effects of this influence. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Methodological Choices 
2.1.1 Analytical Framework
 
How can CSOs create an arena for peacebuilding in Lebanon?
Function + Influence → arena
Methodology
Interviews with 5 Lebanese CSOs working with peacebuilding
Theoretical framwork
John Lederach: 'A Relational Approach'
Tania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk: 'Civil Society in Peacebuilding'
Pamela Aall: 'The Power of Nonofficial Actors'
1. Context
Analytical framework by Paffenholz and Spurk
Empirical data from academic books and reports
2. Function analysis
The 7 functioncs by Paffenholz and Spurk 
Empirical data from context and 5 interviews
3. Middle-range and Power analysis
Middle-range by Lederach and powers of the nonofficial actors by Aall
Empirical data from the previous two analysis supported by the 5 interviews
Discussion of Challenges
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To answer our main question, we have created three research questions that will serve as 
foundation for our analysis. The first question addresses the context of which the CSOs 
operate. The analysis will therefore try to paint a picture of the current situation in Lebanon 
as well as what impact this has on the process of peace building. This is done by analysing 
the political, socioeconomic and cultural dimensions, as well as the different internal and 
external actors. Here we will apply Tania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk’s (2010) 
theoretical framework of how to conduct a context analysis. The second research question 
addresses the functions the CSOs take on in this context. This will be answered by analysing 
empirical data from interviews with five Lebanese CSOs, working with peace building. Here 
Paffenholz and Spurk’s seven functions for civil society in peace building will be applied. 
The last research question addresses the influence the CSOs can obtain through the functions 
outlined above. To answer this question we divide the analysis in two. The first part will use 
John P. Lederach’s (1997) notion of middle-range leaders to analyse if the CSOs can act as 
the middle-range level, or empower it, in order to obtain influence in the peace building 
process. To elaborate on Lederach’s theory, we analyse how the CSOs can act as middle-
range level, or empower it, by applying the theoretical framework of Pamela Aall (2007) 
‘Non-official organisations in conflict management’ build upon Jeffrey Z. Rubin’s (1992) 
theory of ‘Power in mediation’. In the second part, we analyse how the CSOs can have 
influence on the grass-root level, by applying Aall and Rubin’s theories. According to the 
causal explanation, i.e. functions + influence → arena, the three analyses should be able to 
explain our main problem. In the discussion, we add the variable of challenges to this 
equation to get a more nuanced explanation of how CSOs can create an arena for peace 
building. 
 
2.1.2 Case Study  
We have chosen to do a case study of the role of CSOs in peace building in Lebanon, because 
we see an importance and relevance in analysing this phenomenon in depth and in 
understanding more about CSOs in peace building in general. Although we acknowledge that 
our conclusions cannot be generalised to a bigger population of all CSOs in Lebanon or to 
CSOs work on peace building in general, we are still able to add a perspective on the 
phenomenon of the role of CSOs in peace building. We have focused our analysis on a single 
case: Lebanon, more specifically the role of CSOs in the process of peace building in 
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Lebanon. We have an abductive approach to our case study, because we exemplify and 
unfold our theoretical frame through our empirical data, simultaneously with unfolding and 
understanding our case in depth through the theory we have chosen. This gives the project an 
empirical and specific anchor in a contemporary issue, instead of being of purely theoretical 
kind.  
 
We have chosen Lebanon as our case study, because it is a deviant case in a Middle Eastern 
perspective (Gerring 2008: 655). This perception is built on Gerring’s methodological 
framework of how to select a case (Ibid.). The civil society in Lebanon is a deviant case, 
because it stands out in relation to the size and activeness of civil societies in general in the 
Middle East (Safa 2007: 3). Working with a case, where democratic structures allows the 
civil society to work, gives us the best conditions for examining how CSOs can create an 
arena for peace building. The Lebanese case is of both political and theoretical importance. 
The Lebanese case is theoretically important, in the perspective of the theoretical notion that 
a civil society can play a huge role in peace building. Politically it is important because the 
civil societies of the Middle East often are under great pressure. Since and with the Arab 
spring there has been a larger focus on nourishing the civil society in the region, especially 
mobilising women and youth. In this context, Lebanon is a highly interesting case, and this 
thesis might be able to illustrate some causal factors that can contribute to the general debate 
about the role of the civil society in peace building in the Middle East. A deeper 
understanding of CSOs in the case of Lebanon will be presented in our context section, but 
we also evolve this aspect throughout our thesis. By analysing CSOs work in peace building, 
in the context of Lebanon, we acknowledge that each situation is unique and must be 
addressed on its own terms (Paffenholz 2010: 66). We have chosen to analyse five Lebanese 
CSOs and their approaches to peace building. By examining different CSOs in our case of 
Lebanon, we have a single case study with many variables (Gerring 2008: 647). This gives us 
a unique look into the phenomenon, but at the same time an opportunity to do a comparative 
study of the CSOs. Thus, we have the opportunity to make an analysis of CSOs in Lebanon, 
who work with peace building, with depth and perspective.  
Finally, we chose to travel to Lebanon in order to experience the case ourselves and conduct 
our interviews. This field study trip has meant a great deal for the thesis, and it has been most 
valuable for our understanding of the specific Lebanese context in depth. That we have 
experienced the situation ourselves has given us a better understanding of the conflict and 
made us that more passionate in our research.  
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2.1.3 Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
To give our analysis both a qualitative and quantitative fundament, we have chosen to do 
interviews with five CSOs through an informed selection of CSOs working with peace 
building in Lebanon. We use the interviews as qualitative empirical data. Of quantitative 
methods, we have used statistics on Lebanon and the civil society in Lebanon in general, in 
order to have the possibility to extend the findings from our interviews.  
 
2.1.2.1 Interview Method and Interview Displays 
We base our interview methods on Brian C. Rathbun’s (2008) chapter “Interviewing and 
Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism and Practices” in “The Oxford Handbook: Political 
Methodology”. 
  
The interviewees are chosen based on their leading role in the organisations they represent. 
However, this is said with the reservation that the interviewees cannot speak for the entire 
organisation. Their opinions are subjective and will therefore be used as subjective opinions 
in our thesis. 
 
We have chosen to do semi-structured interviews. Because we have chosen to do a case 
study, semi-structured interviews stress the context over generalisation and complexity over 
parsimony (Rathbun 2008: 686), and in our thesis this enables us to gather detailed 
information about our CSOs and the context of Lebanon. We have made an interview guide 
to every interview, in order to structure our interviews beforehand and to outline what themes 
and questions were relevant for our project, in the context of the specific organisation. We 
have structured the interview guides based on our knowledge of the organisations, Lebanon 
and the theory on peace building (Lederach 1997; Paffenholz 2010). We have not specifically 
asked about theoretical concepts. Rathbun argues that semi-structured interviews stress 
induction over deduction, because semi-structured interviews leave room for the interviewees 
to influence the interview, beyond the interviewer’s theoretical background (Rathbun 2008: 
686). We argue that we use a combination because we did structure our interviews on the 
basis of our theoretical framework, but at the same time, the interviews have guided our 
further theoretical discussions. Thus, our abductive method is also an important part of how 
we analyse our interviews. Basing our interview guides on empirical data and theory has 
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made us able to guide the interview in a direction that was relevant for our project, and 
simultaneously being able to ask more qualified questions with the ability to ask in-depth 
questions on different issues. At the same time, we are aware that it may have biased us in 
our choice of themes and questions.  
 
Possibilities and Constraints from the Use of Interviews 
Rathbun argues that the purpose of interviewing is to go in-depth in a way that second hand 
sources, archives and surveys do not allow (Rathbun 2008: 688). 
We have chosen to do interviews, because we not only want to understand what functions our 
CSOs take on to create an arena for peace building, but also why they have chosen these 
functions, and how they can gain influence in the peace building process. Behaviour can 
rarely speak for itself: We can read about the projects and actions of the CSOs e.g. on their 
webpages or in project booklets, however, there are often multiple causes and motivations for 
the same outcome (Ibid.: 690). Rathbun argues that research is often driven by the desire to 
explain an already established outcome. The CSOs’ actions, through the theoretical defined 
functions, cannot speak for themselves. Thus, it is also important to establish the motivations 
behind their behaviour (Ibid.: 692). Interview questions on causes and motivations are often 
easier to criticise, because they can be subjects to more interpretation than specific questions 
on facts (Ibid.: 692). We have taken initiatives to overcome this challenge. As we are not 
interested in examining whether or not the CSOs have had any success with their peace 
building projects, we use our interviews as opinions and not as facts. Rathbun argues that 
critique of interviews is based on concerns for reliability and validity (Ibid.: 685). Even 
though we use our interviews as opinions, to meet the concerns of reliability and validity, we 
have chosen to analyse our interviews in the context of Lebanon. By using multiple sources 
on the same data, we give reliability and validity to the statements of our interviewees. 
 
In order to process our data, we have chosen to do interview displays to give a short and 
precise overlook of what themes the interview contains. We have outlined our interview 
displays based on the following categories. The categories are outlined, based on general 
themes we have asked all our interviewees about. 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Main objectives 
3. Projects 
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4. Methods 
5. Others (unique themes from the specific interviews) 
6. Challenges 
7. Funding 
 
2.2 Empirical Choices 
The empirical choices of the thesis are determined by our choice of case: The CSOs in 
Lebanon and their role in the process of peace building. The empirical choices have been 
mostly qualitative with the use of interviews as well as academic books and reports. 
Furthermore, quantitative data has been included to clarify specific statistical facts about 
Lebanon and its civil society. The chapter will elaborate on the qualitative empirical choices 
including choice of interviewees representing CSOs followed by an elaboration of the 
quantitative empirical data mainly based on the EU funded report ‘Mapping the Civil Society 
Organisations in Lebanon’, conducted by BRD. Conclusively, the chapter will include a 
critique of our empirical choices as well as an explanation of the consequences of these 
choices.  
 
2.2.1 Qualitative Empirical Data  
The qualitative empirical data in this thesis is first of all based on five interviews. The 
interviewees represent CSOs that are chosen on the basis of an understanding of peace 
building as the process to obtain sustainable peace (1.3 Concept Clarification). In the 
analysis, the interviewees appear as individuals representing the CSOs, why their quotes and 
argumentations can only be claimed to be their subjective opinion. The qualitative empirical 
data is also based on academic books and reports as well as news articles from both Lebanese 
and international medias. Our first research question focus on the context and is primarily 
answered with the use of articles, academic reports and books concerning Lebanon. As we try 
to define the contemporary context of our case, the qualitative data will be specifically 
focused on the structures and actors, creating the framework for which the CSOs act. The 
second research question will be answered by analysing the five CSO interviews, including 
especially the projects and actions of the CSOs, as we try to explain the functions the CSOs 
can take on in the process of peace building. The third and last research question will be 
answered through both the five CSO interviews and relevant academic reports on CSOs 
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working with peace building in Lebanon.  
 
 
2.2.1.1 Interview Displays: Choices of CSOs  
Maher Btaiche - Forum for Development Culture and Dialogue (FDCD) (ID 1, 
Appendix 1) 
Maher Btaiche is the coordinator of the ‘Peace building and Conflict Resolution Program’ at 
the NGO FDCD. The mission of the organisation is: “to promote peace building, equal 
citizenship, and human rights in the Middle East by creating common spaces for dialogue and 
building the capacity of community and civil society groups to be catalysts for peace” (FDCD 
12.05.2015). The CSO relates to our thesis focus, because it works for peace building with 
some core values that it finds necessary to access a lasting peace in Lebanon. 
 
Nayla Tabbara - Adyan Foundation (ID 2, Appendix 2) 
Nayla Tabbara is vice-chairman at Adyan and the director of the ‘Cross-Cultural Studies 
Department’ at Adyan. The mission of the organisation is to promote coexistence and 
diversity as well as to foster peace, social cohesion and spiritual solidarity. Being a NGO that 
explicitly values religious diversity, peace and social cohesion, is what makes Adyan very 
interesting in relation to the role of CSOs in the peace building process in Lebanon 
(Adyanvillage 12.05.2015).   
 
Morgane Ortmans - Search for Common Ground (ID3, Appendix 3) 
Morgane Ortmans is Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator at Search for Common 
Ground (SFCG) in Lebanon. SFCG is an international NGO working with peace building 
from the theoretical perspective of the conflict transformation school, and it has more than 30 
headquarters all over the world. It is SFCG’s mission to build peace through a transformation 
of the way conflicts are handled with cooperative solutions. These facts make SFCG Lebanon 
a CSO with a solid background and the possibility of using unique theory based expertise in 
their work for peace building in Lebanon (SFCG 14.05.2015).  
 
Muhammad Al-Sammak - Christian Muslim Committee for Dialogue (ID 4, Appendix 
4) 
Muhammad Al-Sammak is the Secretary General and one of the founding members of the 
Lebanese CSO Christian Muslim Committee for Dialogue. CMCD is a group of 
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representatives from different religious communities, who work on promoting coexistence 
through dialogue with the purpose of strengthening the national unity of Lebanon. What 
makes CMCD a unique CSO in Lebanon, is their close relations with the highest authorities 
in the religious communities (Chrislam 08.05.2015).  
 
Christina Foerch - Permanent Peace Movement and Fighters for Peace (ID 5, Appendix 
5) 
Christina Foerch is a German journalist and documentarist, who has worked with two 
different CSOs in Lebanon: Permanent Peace Movement (PPM) and Fighters for Peace. PPM 
is a Lebanese NGO working for peace building through the empowerment of individuals and 
institutions. Fighters for Peace is an offspring from PPM, who more specifically works with 
former fighters from the civil war, who tell their stories in an attempt to put memory and 
reconciliation on the agenda. Foerch’s involvement in both of these CSOs is especially 
focused on using documentaries and filmmaking as tools to build peace (PPM-Lebanon 
14.05.2015).  
 
2.2.2 Quantitative Empirical Data 
The quantitative empirical data in this thesis is primarily taken from the academic report 
‘Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon’ (2015). The report is conducted by 
Beyond Reform and Development (BRD), a Lebanese consulting firm specialising in policy 
research, public management and capacity development (BeyondRD 21.05.2015). The report 
is as part of the EU funded program ‘Regional Capacity Building Program for Civil Society - 
South Facilitation’. The report includes an in-depth analysis with various statistical data 
about Lebanese CSOs and their specific actions and relations. The statistical data is mapped 
on the basis of three methods: A random representative survey sample of 261 CSOs 
answering 111 different questions, 13 focus group samples of in total 91 community based 
organisations and 12 interviews with major donor organisations in Lebanon. In this thesis, 
statistical data of the report is used both quantitatively to substantiate facts and qualitatively 
in relation to conclusions drawn by BRD in the report. The report is mainly used in the 
context analysis and in the discussion.  
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2.2.3 Empirical Critique 
Our choice of empirical data is based on our understanding of peace building, and this had 
limited our choice of interviewees to organisations that share the same understanding of 
peace building. We are thereby aware of the fact that all cases substantiate the theoretical 
perspective of the thesis. Furthermore, we are aware that conducting an analysis on the basis 
of five interviews with individuals representing an organisation cannot be representative of 
all CSOs in Lebanon. The analysis does not try to conclude whether or not the CSOs in 
Lebanon are successful in creating an arena for peace building, but instead it tries to identify 
tendencies in how they might be able to do this. However, it is also important to be aware of 
the fact that our interviews can be biased because the interviewees may try to promote their 
own work and organisation. This can affect our conclusions on how the CSOs have influence 
through their functions. By using other qualitative and quantitative empirical data, we strive 
to counterbalance this.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Choices  
This chapter will elaborate on our theoretical choices as well as how we apply them in our 
project. We have chosen a theoretical framework consisting of different scholars; Tania 
Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk (2010): “A Comprehensive Analytical Framework”,  John 
Lederach (1997): “Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies”, and 
Pamela Aall’s (2007) chapter “The Power of Nonofficial Actors in Conflict Management” 
which is an reinterpretation of Jeffrey Z. Rubin’s (1992) “Conclusion: International 
Mediation in Context”. We will elaborate on the theoretical overlap as well as present a 
critique of the chosen theories.  
  
2.3.1 John Lederach: A Relational Approach  
Lederach’s arguments for achieving a sustainable peace in a modern world characterised by 
intrastate conflicts rather than interstate conflicts, is the starting point for our case-analysis of 
Lebanon. His promotion of the relational approach to solve conflicts is the same approach as 
the one we adopt in our thesis. We agree that peace building is a long-term process that is not 
only limited to the post settlement restoration, and that it is still highly relevant to the 
Lebanese society today. Furthermore, we adopt his middle-range theory, which argues that if 
the CSOs want to create an arena for peace building, they need to assert an influence at all 
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levels of society. In the analysis, this is applied to examine the approaches of five different 
CSO’s and discover if they can provide the linkage between top-level and bottom-level that 
Lederach describes in his analytical framework.  
 
2.3.2 Tania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk: Civil Society in Peace 
building 
Paffenholz and Spurk’s framework for analysing the work of the civil society in the process 
of peace building is used as a basis for the analysis of our five CSOs. The framework 
presented by Paffenholz and Spurk outlines the functions that the civil society can take on in 
peace building which are related to the specific context of the conflict. We adopt this 
approach in the analysis. First, we analyse the current Lebanese situation, and thereafter we 
analyse which functions the five CSOs take on in relation to that. We adopt Spurk’s 
definition of civil society (1.3 Concept Clarification). However, when he uses a broad 
definition of civil society in general, we are conducting an analysis on five specific CSOs. 
Therefore, we will use the term CSOs throughout the analysis. 
 
2.3.3 Pamela Aall: The Power of Nonofficial Actors 
When talking about power and peace building, it is a common perception that states, 
especially large states, have the most power, whereas international organisations have less 
power, and nonofficial actors have minimal to no power in mediation (Aall 2007: 478). The 
theory of power in mediation is a theory in the field of studies of mediation in International 
Relations. By adopting the assumption that power politics has a major effect on mediation, 
we can examine how power politics can contribute to the analysis of how CSOs can have a 
positive effect on the process of peace building in Lebanon. Mediation is concerned with 
facilitating communication between the different parties and working toward changing the 
parties’ images and attitudes toward one another (Zartman & Touval 1985: 35). 2Aall puts 
forward an approach, by using the concept of power, to understand how nonofficial actors 
can influence the process of mediation. We will adopt this notion and use it to understand 
how different CSOs, by using different kinds of power, can influence the process of peace 
building. Aall’s theory is developed in a conflict management setting, but in this thesis, we 
                                                 
2 Zartman, William and Saadia Touval (1985). “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and 
Power Politics”. 
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use Aall’s power theory in a post-conflict setting. This reinterpretation will be elaborated in 
the following section. 
 
2.3.4 Overlap of Theory 
The three main theories, Lederach, Paffenholz and Spurk and Aall, applied in our thesis, are 
all part of a broad and sometimes diffused field of peace building (Paffenholz 2010: 44). 
They all focus their work on empowering civil society in the peace building process. In this 
thesis, we propose a theoretical framework combining these different approaches, in order to 
gain a comprehensive and more explanatory analysis. Lederach is the foundation for our 
understanding of peace building, and this choice of theory is also reflected in our decision to 
focus our thesis exclusively on the national civil society. Paffenholz and Spurk share the 
same understanding, but neither their theory nor Lederach’s theories are able to fully answer 
our main problem. As already outlined in the introduction, the Lebanese civil society is 
relatively big and many organisations are engaged in peace building. However, Lebanon is 
still not stable. To understand why, we ask if this large civil society really can have an 
influence on the process of peace building in Lebanon. To answer this, we apply Rubin’s 
theory of power in Aall’s reinterpretation, where she applies his framework to non-official 
organisations in conflict management. Both Aall’s and Rubin’s timeframe is different from 
ours because they look at mediation and conflict management. The timeframe in our thesis is 
different because our case is post-conflict. We do, however, see clear similarities, and Aall’s 
analysis enables us to understand, what powers nonofficial organisations can deploy and 
where they are challenged. The combination of our theories thereby allows us to set forth our 
explanatory model, which is outlined in the analytical framework. With this framework, we 
test the explanatory model in another context than conflict management and mediation, to 
examine if the theory can help us understand our empirical data and answer our main 
problem. In the section ‘discussion of conclusions’, we will discuss our explanatory model 
and the results.  
 
2.3.5 Critique of Theory 
Our theoretical choices have to a large extent determined our choice of empirical data as well 
as our analytical framework. We are aware that our theoretical approach to peace building 
does not focus on international or regional actors even though these can also be highly 
relevant in the Lebanese peace building process. Lederach and the conflict transformation 
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school focus mainly on internal actors, and in his relational approach, he does not address 
neither economic interests and gains, nor power (Ibid.: 55). However, the relational approach 
to peace building can be criticised for focusing too much attention on the building of 
relationships, changing the attitudes towards the other and hoping for a spill-over effect, 
which does not necessarily come. Evidence has shown that personal relations have little 
effect on the broader peace building process, if they are not linked to the socio-political level 
(Chigas 2007: 574). Lederach partially address this in his focus on top-level leaders. We try 
to elaborate this with Aall’s power theory. We are aware that Aall’s theory focuses on 
mediation and conflict management, and that we use her theory in another context. In 
addition, Paffenholz and Spurk’s theory can have limitations, because there can be more 
functions of importance to include in analysing the CSOs actions in peace building. Their 
theory can also be criticised for applying a normative notion of civil society as only having a 
positive role in the peace building process.  
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3. Theory 
As already argued in our introduction, there is a growing focus on the possibilities for civil 
society to play a vital role in peace building. To place our analysis in this field, a short 
overview of peace building as a concept is provided, followed by an elaboration on the three 
main theories, John Lederach (1997), Tania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk (2010) and 
Pamela Aall (2007).   
 
3.1 Civil Society in Peace Building 
Thania Paffenholz (2010) puts forward two great divides among scholars in the field of peace 
building: liberal peace building and sustainable peace building. She traces this division back 
to Johan Galtung, who was the first to use the word peace building in an essay from 1975. He 
understands peace building as being the creation of positive peace, which means the creation 
of “structures and institutions of peace based on justice, equity, and cooperation” (Paffenholz 
2010: 45). This definition is in opposition to negative peace, which has a short-term 
timeframe, where the absence of violence is the immediate goal. This roughly reflects the 
difference between ‘liberal peace’ (negative peace) and ‘sustainable peace’ (positive peace), 
even though liberal peace has a somewhat wider understanding of peace building, which also 
incorporates a mid-term timeframe and a focus on state building. In this thesis, we adopt the 
idea of sustainable peace, which is largely identified with John Paul Lederach and his 
relational approach. Sustainable peace has a wider time frame and focus on reconciliation 
within societies. For a more varied picture of the different theoretical approaches to peace 
building, and how it is related to civil society, we will shortly go through three different 
schools within the two branches of peace building mentioned above. The conflict 
management school focuses its peace building on short-term management, which is the 
ending of violence and the negotiation of a peace agreement. Peace-builders are external 
diplomats, and they focus their mediation on the top-level leadership, which has the means to 
end a violent conflict. The conflict management school sees the role of civil society as 
limited, because of their focus on state actors. The conflict resolution school tries to solve the 
underlying causes of conflict and to reconcile former conflicting groups. In this perspective, 
conflict resolution is more in line with the sustainable peace approach. It also differs from the 
management school by not only focusing on the elite leadership of a country, but on the 
entire society. The conflict transformation school is closely related to conflict resolution, but 
in the transformation school, local actors play the most important role. John P. Lederach, and 
 23 
his mid-range level focus, is central to this approach. Both the conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation school, see civil society actors as playing a vital role because they highlight 
non-state actors as being the most suitable in addressing root causes and relationships 
between conflictual parties and society. The main difference between the two is that the 
resolution school focuses mainly on external actors, whereas the transformation school 
focuses on internal actors. There is generally a positive view on the many achievements done 
by the civil society and a focus on the necessity of internal actors playing a role in the peace 
building process. However, there are also more critical studies of civil society or NGOs work 
in peace building. This critique is based on the weak membership base and the lack of 
transparency in CSOs and NGOs, creating limited capacities for social capital and ownership 
(Ibid.: 56-60). 
 
In our project, we largely adopt the ideas of the conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation school, and the next section will give an in-depth introduction to Lederach’s 
thesis on peace building and reconciliation. 
 
3.2 John P. Lederach: A Relational Approach  
John P. Lederach’s ‘Building Peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies’ (1997) is 
a key piece in existing scholarship on peace building (Paffenholz 2010: 47). Lederach’s 
argument is that conventional peace building is not able to deal with intrastate wars because it 
is centred on unit-action as well as interests and issues. Instead, Lederach proposes a 
relational approach to peace building where the idea of reconciliation is one of the core 
concepts. Reconciliation addresses the underlying causes of ethnic and identity conflicts, and 
it provides a shift from units to relationships within systems. In this, Lederach sees a 
fundamental change from the realist scholars in International Relations and their focus on 
hard politics, interests and gains. This change is specifically needed in order to tackle civil 
wars and especially to prevent the relapse of violence because the people involved, live door 
by door and eventually have to cooperate to rebuild the country (Ibid.: 24-34).  
 
3.2.1 Analytical Framework  
After establishing his relational approach, Lederach turns to another key debate within peace 
building; where does peace building begin? Is it bottom-up or top-down? To answer this 
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question, Lederach develops an analytical framework that classifies post-war societies into 
three different categories. His framework provides an overview of the related actors and thus 
makes it easier to discuss when and where the different parts of society can play a 
constructive role in the peace building process. A pyramid illustrates this division; the smaller 
top part, is the ‘top-level leadership’, the middle part is the ‘middle-range level leadership’ 
and the big, bottom part, is the ‘grass-root leadership’ (Lederach 1997: 39).  
 
 
 
Top-level 
The top-level leadership is the smallest group of society, and includes the key political and 
military leaders. These leaders are the public image of their constituencies and this sometimes 
restricts their actions. They constantly need to make sure, that they represent the interest of 
their communities, vis-à-vis their opponents, and every step they take is being watched 
closely. If they make mistakes, they will lose their legitimacy or/and possibly worsen the 
situation of the people they represent. The top-level leadership constitutes influential and 
powerful people, and very often they are of vital importance to securing peace. Top-level 
leadership utilises the top-down approach to peace building, and thus peace building at this 
level is about identifying the representative leaders and getting them to reach an agreement 
(Ibid.: 38). 
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Middle-range Level 
The middle-range leadership is based on a broader group of people who share some of the 
visibility with the top-level leadership, thus they also enjoy the support of some sort of 
community, but are not nearly as locked in their positions. They are not necessarily in formal 
positions, but still have the ability to act as a link between the top-level and the grass roots. 
This can be people in all sorts of positions: priests, academics, cultural persons, and heads of 
NGO’s or universities. All of them enjoy respect in their specific area, which gives them 
legitimacy among the population, and it also insures that the top-level leaders, will know of 
them. Their unique position in society creates a space in which they can reach out to top-level 
leaders without losing their connection to the rest of the population. Middle-range leadership 
has the possibility to broaden the peace building process by including more than just the 
formal leaders of conflicting groups. ‘Problem-solving workshops’3 are for instance a way to 
create an informal meeting place for adversaries to meet and discuss issues of the record. The 
idea is that because of the connections to the top-level that the middle-range leadership has, 
some of the ideas evolved in these workshops can eventually be implemented at a higher 
level as well. Another practice of the middle-range is ‘conflict resolution training’. This has a 
more educational approach than the problem-solving workshops, in that it tries to teach the 
participants how to tackle conflicts in general. The participants are taught to prevent and/or 
react to conflicts in the form of analytical, communication, negotiation or mediation skills. 
Technically, the conflict resolution training can be done at all three levels, but Lederach 
argues that it might be used most strategically at the midlevel: “it becomes a strategic tool as 
it promotes the development of peace building capacities within the middle-range leadership” 
(Lederach 1997:49).  
 
Grass-root Level 
The third level is the grass-root leadership, which contains local community leaders, 
members of NGO’s, health officials and refugee camp leaders. This is the people who witness 
first-hand how the conflict plays out. An important point about the interplay between the 
different levels is that it is vertical, rather than horizontal. Thus, the picture Lederach draws 
of a society affected by internal conflicts, is not a class-divided society, but rather a society 
divided between ethnicity and religion. Even though the underprivileged parts of the 
                                                 
3 Developed by Herbert Kelman 1996 (Aall 2007: 485).  
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conflictual societies are often the ones experiencing the direct consequences of the conflicts, 
such as social and economic insecurity, political and cultural discrimination and human rights 
violations, alliances in contemporary conflicts usually forms around identity rather than class. 
This will often show itself in a client-patronage relationship between the political elite and 
their constituencies (Lederach 1997:42).  
 
The middle-way  
One of Lederach’s most important conclusions, something that has been highly utilised by 
practitioners in the field (Paffenholz 2010: 59), is the need for empowerment at the middle-
range level: 
 
“If mobilised strategically for peace building, middle-range leaders could lay the foundation 
for long-term, sustainable conflict transformation. It is at this level, therefore, that innovative 
and intensive strategies - a “middle-out approach” - must be encouraged and supported” 
(Lederach 1997: 151).  
 
Lederach believes that the middle-range actors are the ones best suited to secure an 
infrastructure for peace because they, with the support of the population, can reach the top 
level.  
 
3.3 Tania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk: Civil Society in Peace 
building 
This section outlines the theoretical framework of Tania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk 
(2010). The theoretical framework explains how to conduct a context analysis, as well as 
what functions the CSOs are able to provide in the process of peace building. The functions, 
which are elaborated on, are: Protection, Monitoring, Advocacy and Public Communication, 
In-Group Socialization, Social Cohesion, Facilitation and Intermediation, and Service 
Delivery.  
 
3.3.1 Context 
When trying to understand how the civil society can be a part of peace building, it is 
necessary to address the context of the conflict and the society it takes place in. In relation to 
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each case study, it is highly needed to portray the conflict’s socio-political, cultural, 
economic, regional and global environment. This includes the political regime as well as 
main characteristics of media and other main actors in society, which should be seen as 
independent variables. Furthermore, the context analysis requires a description of the local, 
regional and global parties involved in the conflict. Finally, the analysis of the context needs 
to portray the status of the civil society (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010: 66). 
  
3.3.2 Functions 
The second element of the analytical framework is to define and analyse the functions of civil 
society in peace building. Paffenholz and Spurk set up seven different functions. 
 
Protection 
The first function is ‘protection’. In a situation where there is a threat of violence and a lack 
of security, the civil society is hindered in acting as a peace builder. This can cause them to 
take on the function of protection: Creating security with activities such as international 
accompaniment, watchdog activities, the creation of ‘zone of peace’ areas, humanitarian aid 
and initiatives for human security. The protection role is often taken on by external NGOs, 
but is not per se a civil society function and cannot fully replace the protection function of the 
state, even though this is often seen in weak states impacted by armed conflict (Ibid.: 67-68).  
 
Monitoring 
‘Monitoring’ is when CSOs monitor a development, often as a prerequisite for advocacy and 
public communication or protection. Through monitoring the CSOs have the ability to hold 
the state accountable and provide information, e.g. of potential violations of human rights and 
give recommendations to decision makers (Ibid.: 68). 
 
Advocacy and Public Communication  
‘Advocacy and Public Communication’ refers to communication and to put social and 
political issues on the public agenda. Main activities within this function could be awareness 
workshops and public campaigns, lobbying for civil society involvement in peace 
negotiations or creating public pressure by mass mobilisation. Advocacy can be done through 
different channels; non-public or public. In non-public advocacy, civil society actors try to 
achieve influence through informal dialogues, diplomatic channels or political elites. In 
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public advocacy, civil society actors try to achieve influence through demonstrations, press 
releases, petitions and statements in relation to a specific demand. In the post-conflict phase, 
civil society can advocate against recurrence of violence, proper implementation of the post-
conflict agenda and building a ‘culture of peace’ within the society (Ibid.: 68-70). 
 
In-group socialization  
‘In-group socialization' can support democratic behaviour and values within the society 
through activity in associations, networks and movements. The objective is to create a culture 
of peace or an in-group identity through peace education and training in conflict resolution 
and negotiation. The basic idea is to empower a specific oppressed or marginalised group, so 
that this group can engage in a fruitful dialogue with other, former adversary groups. An 
important notion to in-group socialisation is that it has to be constructive and non-threatening 
to other groups. (Ibid.: 70-71). 
 
Social Cohesion 
‘Social Cohesion’ builds on the concept of ‘bridging ties’. During and after a conflict, it is 
crucial to rebuild trust between the adversarial groups. Paffenholz and Spurk identify three 
types of social cohesion activities. First, relationship oriented cohesion, which has the 
objective of fostering new relationships between representatives and/or members of 
conflicting groups, through a long-term change of attitudes through workshops, dialogue and 
exchange visits. The second social cohesion activity has an outcome-oriented approach. It 
deals with the same people, but with the objective of reaching a larger outcome as an 
initiative for peace building. The third and last activity focuses on cohesion through business 
or development work, where different groups together take initiatives to run services, which 
builds social capital and trust almost unconsciously (Ibid.: 71-73). 
 
Intermediation and facilitation  
‘Intermediation and Facilitation’ is based on the idea that civil society can facilitate formal 
and informal initiatives and thereby be a contact between citizens and state, and among 
adversarial, possibly armed groups, or at different levels of society (Ibid.: 73-74). 
 
Service Delivery  
‘Service Delivery’ is the provision of aid and services. Paffenholz and Spurk argues that aid 
delivery can be seen as both a hindrance for civil society peace building, because it distracts 
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energy from other functions, but also as an important function, if for example the donors and 
agencies, explicitly try to find entry points for peace building through their service delivery 
(Ibid.: 74). 
 
3.4 Pamela Aall: The Power of Nonofficial Actors 
Power in mediation is the resources and relationships that the mediator, or in our case CSOs, 
brings to the conflict (Rubin 1992: 249), and can be defined as a strategic resource. When a 
resource is defined as strategic, it has to be understood in a broader framework of potential 
application and use. If it is relevant for solving a conflict, for example for the process of 
getting different parties to participate in a dialogue group or to influence state leaders, it 
becomes a strategic resource. The resource is strategic if it can be used to reach the desirable 
outcome. Jeffrey Z. Rubin (1992) defines six strategic powers in mediation (Rubin 1992: 
249) and these are: legitimacy, informational, expert, referent, coercive and reward power. In 
the following, we will define these powers using Rubin’s chapter “Conclusion: International 
mediation in context” and Pamela Aall’s (2007) essay “The Power of Nonofficial Actors in 
Conflict Management”. Aall’s chapter is our main theoretical source because she directly 
applies the different sorts of power that Rubin identifies, and uses them to understand the 
power of non-official organisations, e.g. CSOs, in peace making with mediation and peace 
building activities. Aall uses the term non-official actors as a broad concept for international 
and local organisations, small and large, with or without strong ties to the official world, 
working entirely in or through the civil society (Aall 2007: 478). 
 
Informational Power 
Informational power is when the mediator provides information that can make the adversaries 
comply with the mediator’s request (Aall 2007: 481). It can also be when the mediator 
provides information that the parties want or need from the outside world or about the other 
party (Ibid.). It is the ability to act as a communicator; both delivering information, but also 
helping conflicting groups recognize, define and articulate their needs and possible areas of 
negotiations (Ibid.). The different powers are in most cases interlinked, and it can be argued 
that the mediator cannot use informational power without having referent and legitimate 
power. If the mediator is not seen as a legitimate actor with good relations to the parties, it 
sometimes does not matter if the information is valuable or true. On the other hand it can also 
work as a legitimate power, if your information is reliable (Aall 2007: 482; Rubin 1992: 256). 
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Expert Power 
Expert power is when the mediator has greater knowledge and experiences with certain 
issues, or the power to make the parties believe so. This knowledge can come from 
experiences, but it can also come from informational power as analytical insight, intelligence 
or an expertise in a formulating role (Aall 2007: 482). Sometimes expert power also comes 
from sharing a similar experience with the conflict parties (Ibid.). Expert power can thus also 
be a disadvantage (Ibid.: 483). If an expert, even representing a NGO, draws on her or his 
experience from working in a government position in for example the US, it can be a 
disadvantage when being a mediator between Islamist groups in the Middle East.   
 
Legitimate Power 
The concept of legitimate power refers to the parties’ perception that the mediator has a right 
to act as a third party, as well as to ask or request for changes in behaviour (Aall 2007: 481). 
The power may come from representing a powerful institution or organisation, but it can also 
come from the methods that for example NGOs use. An example could be reframing or 
facilitating different settings for negotiations as with Kelman’s problem-solving workshop 
approach (Ibid.: 485). Aall argues, that an expansion of Rubin’s definition of legitimacy as 
“the right to make a request” (Rubin 1992: 255) to “the right to make a request or to ask them 
to reframe the terms of the conflict” (Aall 2007: 486) is needed to understand how non-
official actors use legitimate power. By using the latter definition, Aall argues that if 
legitimate power is seen this way, non-official actors frequently exercise legitimate power. 
 
Referent Power 
Rubin identifies referent power as building on the relationship that exists between the 
mediator and the disputing parties (Rubin 1992: 256). It reflects how the conflicting parties 
value the relationship with the mediator. If the value is high, the disputants are more likely to 
listen to the mediator, because they trust that the mediator have their best interest at heart 
(Rubin 1992: 256; Aall 2007: 481). Aall argues that when analysing the referent power of 
nonofficial actors it is relevant to use the concept ‘insider-partials’ as mediators in internal 
disputes. An inside-partial is a mediator from within the conflict, who is accepted by the 
disputing parties, exactly because the mediator is not distant or objective but rather 
connected, involved and has trusting relationships with the conflicting parties (Aall 2007: 
484). An inside partial mediator does not leave the post-negotiation situation, as well as the 
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mediator has an interest in and will be personally affected by the outcome in an agreement. 
These attributes can be seen as high referent power (Ibid.).  
 
Reward and Coercive Power 
Reward power is “when the influencer offers some positive benefits in exchange for 
compliance” (Rubin 1992: 255), this could be aid, trade or side payments. Coercive power is 
the language of threat, or the ability to use force, to change the behaviour or perception of the 
parties (Rubin 1992: 255; Aall 2007: 481). Reward and threat are usually tools for state-based 
mediators, and Aall concludes that nonofficial organisations are weak in regard to these two 
powers (Aall 2007: 486). Furthermore, they do not have the financial or the military 
resources to deploy neither of the powers fully although Aall does argue that by using the 
other forms of power mentioned above it is possible for non-official organisation to put 
pressure on international organisations or the international society, who possess reward and 
coercive power. Aall argues that if the moment is ‘ripe’, just providing a moment in which 
change is possible by initiating negotiations can be enough for nonofficial organisations to 
have an impact (Ibid.).  
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4. Analysis 
4.1 The Lebanese context  
The following analysis will try to answer in which context the Lebanese CSOs work. This is 
done by elaborating on the different important structures and actors who create the 
framework in which the CSOs act. First, we introduce the demographic composition of 
Lebanon. This is especially important because of the pluralistic character of the Lebanese 
society. This pluralism has resulted in a specific representative character of the political 
system, namely the confessional system. This will lead us to an elaboration of the 
confessional system and the contemporary political situation. From this we move on to a 
short introduction of the Lebanese media, followed by an elaboration of the civil society. 
From here, we give a short introduction to Hezbollah as it is a highly important organisation, 
both in Lebanese politics and in regional politics. Hereafter we highlight the external 
environment: The Syrian and Israeli conflicts, and the contemporary Syrian crises. This is 
important for the work of the CSOs in Lebanon because of Lebanon's geographical location. 
Lebanon is situated between Israel and Syria, and both countries have had a huge influence 
on Lebanon throughout the history and still have today. The Syrian civil war has affected the 
whole Middle Eastern region, but Lebanon in specific - both politically and socio-
economically. The last section will elaborate on the contemporary socio-economic situation 
in Lebanon.  
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Despite a fairly peaceful climate today, some argue that an outbreak of a new civil war is 
never far away in Lebanon (Nielsen 19.11.2014; Picard and Ramsbotham 2012a: 7). The 
regional instability, the Syrian civil war and the internal political paralysis have pushed 
Lebanon close to the edge. Picard and Ramsbotham4 argue that these facts have resulted in 
the breakdown of the Lebanese state, and that the contemporary situation might even be more 
                                                 
4 Elisabeth Picard is currently Director of Research at the Institut de Recherches et d’Études sur le 
Monde Arabe et Musulman, at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Aix-en-Provence 
(CR 26.05.2015a). 
Alexander Ramsbotham Accord Series Editor at Conciliation Resources (CR 26.05.2015b). 
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uncertain than in the years before the civil war. The assassination of former Prime Minister 
Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 sparked the ‘Cedar Revolution’ between pro-Syrians and those who 
blamed the assassination on the Syrians. The revolution forced Syria to withdraw from 
Lebanon (Ghosn and Khoury 2011: 384). Today Lebanese politics is still divided between a 
pro-Syrian coalition, led by Hezbollah called 8th March and an anti-Syrian coalition, called 
the 14th of March Coalition (Picard and Ramsbotham 2012b: 12). 
 
4.1.2 The Demographic Composition  
Lebanon has a small population of around 4.6 million people (2012) (UN Data 25.05.2015). 
Lebanon has around 446 thousand registered Palestinian refugees living in established camps 
around Lebanon in 2014 (UNRWA 01.07.2015) and 1.3 million registered Syrian refugees in 
the beginning of 2015 (UNHCR 2015: 2). Lebanon is a highly diverse society. The cleavages 
of Lebanon are not only of religious character but also include class divisions as well as 
regional and clan allegiances. This can lead to problems with forming a collective identity 
and with fair representation and distribution of power (Zahar 2012: 65). Lebanon has 18 
different religious communities: 54 % of the population are Muslims, half Sunni, half Shia, 
41 % are Christians containing 14 different sect, including 20,5 % Maronite Catholics, 8 % 
Greek Orthodox, 5 % Greek Catholic and 6,5 % other Christian minorities. Furthermore, 
there are 5,6 % Druzes and a very small number of Jews, Baha’is, Buddhist, Hindus and 
Mormons (The World Factbook 13.05.2015). The age demographics of Lebanon show a 
picture of fairly young population, with around 42.4 % under the age of 245 (Ibid.).  
 
4.1.3 Political Environment  
4.1.3.1 Confessional System 
The Lebanese constitution was written in 1926 (Ziadeh 2006: 61). Lebanon gained its 
independence from France in November 1943, which lead to a reformation of the 
constitution. The reform was built on the subtext ‘The National Pact’, which declared 
Lebanon to be a liberal, democratic and sovereign state. Furthermore, the text declared the 
‘six Christian to five Muslims’ ratio, which was implemented as a basis for power sharing in 
all governmental positions. Another important dimension was the establishment of ‘the office 
of the three presidents’: the President, the Prime minister and the Speaker of the Parliament. 
                                                 
5 In comparison, in neighbouring countries as Syria and Jordan the youth constitute respectively 57% 
and 56% (Credit Suisse 2011). 
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These positions were de facto assigned to respectively a Maronite, a Sunni and a Shia. It was 
decided that all top-positions in the society should be based on these two systems (Ziadeh 
2006: 111-118). The Ta’if Accord from 1990 reinforced the confessional system, but also 
brought many constitutional changes in relation to the system. It established the distribution 
of parliamentary seats to be fifty-fifty between Christian and Muslims, as well as a number of 
initiatives preventing any community from dominating over others (Zahar 2012: 66). The 
confessional system reinforced with Ta’if Accord was a political agreement of power sharing 
between the different warlords controlling the fighting militias. This means that the warlords 
today are political leaders, and thus still have power to control their community and the 
development in Lebanon. Rolf Holmboe6 defines this as a reversed Clausewitz; not ‘war as 
an extension of politics’ but ‘politics as an extension of war’ (Nielsen 27.11.2014). 
 
4.1.3.2 The Contemporary Political Situation 
On the November 5th 2014, the Lebanese parliament decided to delay the democratic 
elections for the second time, officially due to increasing violence. This means that the 
government in office has doubled its period from four years to eight. Another issue 
influencing the political situation is the problems with finding a replacement for the former 
Maronite President, Michael Sleimen, whose period of six years ended in May 2014. The 
parliament has attempted to reach an agreement on this more than 15 times, and the two 
candidates, who represents respectively the 8th and the 14th of March coalitions, both seem 
to be unable to unify the blocks (Nielsen 19.11.2014).  
 
 
4.1.4 Internal Environment  
4.1.4.1 The Media 
The Lebanese constitution states that Lebanon has freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press (BRD 2015: 28), still many media outlets tend to act as voices of a specific political or 
sectarian fraction (Dajani 06.05.2015).  
 
4.1.4.2 Hezbollah 
Hezbollah is a well-organised political and military organisation, which has played an 
important role in the Lebanese society since the civil war, where it emerged as a 
                                                 
6 Danish Ambassador in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan  
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fundamentalist Shiite and anti-Israel organisation. Today, Hezbollah is led by general 
secretary Hassan Nasrallah, and in the 2009 election, it won 10 seats in the parliament 
(Masters 03.01.2014).  
 
4.1.4.3 Civil Society  
Compared to the rest of the Middle East region, Lebanon has always had a vibrant civil 
society, and today Lebanon hosts 8.311 registered civil society organisations (BRD 2015: 
53). It is mandatory to register associations, and without approval from the Ministry of 
Interior and Municipalities, it is not possible for the associations to open a bank account for 
example (Ibid.: 69). Most civil society organisations are small, with less than 10 full-time 
employees, and they do not have a high number of volunteers either (Ibid.: 59). Most 
organisations receive their funding from international organisations and donors, but many 
also receive funding from private donors (Ibid.). There is also a big group of NGOs that 
belongs to established religious groups, or families of sectarian leaders (Ibid.: 29). Especially 
during and after the civil war, it became common for powerful political elites to sponsor 
organisations in order to provide for their constituency. Examples of such organisations are 
the Hariri Foundation7 and the Bachir Gemayel Foundation8 (Abi Yaghi 2012: 73). Today 
this kind of NGOs provide up to 60 % of basic health and education services and are a 
driving factor in the ‘sectarianisation’ of the civil society (BRD 2015: 29). 
 
4.1.5 The External Environment 
4.1.5.1 The Syrian and Israeli Conflicts 
During the civil war, the Lebanese politicians invited both Syrian and Israeli troops into 
Lebanon. The Syrian troops responded to the request by assisting Christian Maronite 
president at that time, Suleiman Frangieh. Later on, the Christian politicians asked Israel for 
military and political support. After the Ta’if Accord, Syria remained in Lebanon and exerted 
great influence on elections, juridical procedures and security forces. Israeli forces also 
remained closely involved in Lebanon, first due to clashes with Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) and later Hezbollah (Zahar 2012: 66-69). The Cedar Revolution changed 
the balance of power, which lead to Syria losing control with Lebanon. This shift in the 
                                                 
7 Founded by the late Sunni Premier Minister Rafiq al-Harir (1944-2005) in 1979 (Hariri Foundation 
22.05.2015) 
8 Named after the late Christian president-elect Bachir Gemayel (1947-82) and founded by his wife, 
Solange Gemayel, in 1982 (Bachir Gemayel Foundation 23.05.2015)  
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regional power balance led to the “2006 July War” between Israel and Hezbollah (Knudsen 
and Kerr 2012: 8).   
 
4.1.5.2 The Syrian Crisis  
The Syrian civil war started, as the rest of the Arab spring, with peaceful mass 
demonstrations, but when the Syrian regime answered this by sending in military troops to 
restore order, it quickly escalated to a bloody civil war between pro-regime and opposition 
groups (BBC 22.05.15). The Syrian conflict has spread beyond its own borders and it deeply 
affects the stability and security in Lebanon. The most intense aspect of it is the division 
between anti- and pro-Assad groups, as these are an extension of the deepening cleavages 
between Sunni and Shia Muslims, which is a general conflict in the Middle East region 
(Meier 2013: 353). This spill-over effect has also increased the security threat. Especially 
Tripoli, Bekaa Valley and other areas near the Syrian border have been affected by increasing 
violence both in the form of combat and terrorist attacks (Sreenivasan 2013). 
The violent character of the Syrian conflict has caused a great number of Syrian refugees. 
The neighbouring countries host the largest part of the Syrian refugees, and Lebanon has the 
highest concentration of refugees per capita in the world (Reuters 17.04.2015). According to 
UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency), there were 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon in 
the beginning of 2015, and they predict that there will be 1.8 million Syrian refugees by the 
end of the year (UNHCR 2015: 2). The Syrian crisis is said to be the biggest humanitarian 
crisis in our era by the UNHCR (UNCHR 22.05.2015). The refugees are spread all over the 
country in unofficial settlements, as there are, for political reasons, no official refugee camps 
for Syrian refugees. Lebanon is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention9 and has not 
allowed the United Nations to set up formal camps. The decision of not setting up formal 
refugee camps can be traced back to the civil war and the many Palestinian refugees that now 
live permanently in Lebanon. Many politicians argue that if formal camps are set up, the 
Syrians will never leave, and the situation can escalate into a civil war as in 1975 (McVeigh 
22.07.2013). Taking in so many refugees has an impact economically, politically and 
socially. Most Syrian refugees live in areas where poor Lebanese people also live, and this 
creates tensions as many poor Lebanese people blame the Syrians for taking their jobs, taking 
                                                 
9 UNHCR’s official legal document in defining who’s a refugee, their rights and the obligation of the 
state.  
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the scarce electricity and being the reason for lower income rates and higher food prices 
(McVeigh 22.07.2013).  
 
4.1.6 The Contemporary Socio-economic Situation 
Lebanon is one of the financial centres of the Middle East, and the Lebanese economy 
influences the economy of the whole Middle East region. Investments were many in 2008-
2009, but the eruption of the Syrian conflict has had tremendous effects on the Lebanese 
economy (World Bank 2015: 6). Lebanon is hit by four interrelated crises: A socioeconomic 
crisis, which has to do with the Syrian refugee crisis, and a sectarian crisis, that has created a 
political crisis (4.1.3.2 The Contemporary Political Situation) (Nielsen 27.11.2014). Because 
of the Syrian conflict, Lebanon has very little economic growth, and the fear is that if the 
crisis does not end soon, the Lebanese economy can go into de-growth. The Syrian refugees 
have enlarged the labour supply, and right now the unemployment rate is three times higher 
than in 2012 (Ibid.). Even though the growth rate in GDP rose in 2014, the economy is still 
deeply affected by the Syrian conflict, and the political dead-lock is, in many instances, 
standing in the way of dealing with the crisis and making reforms to get the economy on 
track (The Daily Star 16.04.2015). The public services provided by the Lebanese government 
are in such bad conditions that the Lebanese population is forced to rely more on individual 
or private initiatives to support basic social and economic needs. The service of public 
education is declining in quality; simultaneously with more and more Lebanese people 
joining the faith based private schools. The low level of investment in the public sector can 
explain these developments. In 2010, the government only spent 1.6 % of their total spending 
on public schools. It is the same situation in the public health sector. The number of public 
hospital beds represents only 16,6 % of the total hospital beds available in Lebanon. In 
relation to the provision of both these services, the private sector, mainly community based 
CSOs, become the primary actor (BRD 2015: 33-36). 
 
4.1.7 Partial Conclusion 
The context in which the CSO’s operate is both historical and contemporary. The 
consequences of the civil war and the Ta’if Accord are reflected in the contemporary 
confessional system, the weakness of the state and the political crisis. The paramount crisis is 
the Syrian conflict, which highly affects the Lebanese economy and stability. In relation to 
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our main problem, all of these aspects are important for the CSO’s possibility to create an 
arena for peace building in Lebanon. 
 
4.2 Functions in the Peace Building Process 
In the light of the context above, this section will try to outline what functions our 
interviewees argue that their organisations provide. We argue that the CSOs’ choice of 
function is related to the context that they work in. In Lebanon, the weak state, the Syrian 
refugee crises, the fragile economy, the sectarian cleavages are all factors that determine how 
the organisations work. The following analysis will combine the empirical data from our 
interviews with the seven functions outlined by Tania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk 
(2010), taking the context into account. 
 
4.2.1 Protection 
The function of protection mainly relates to situations, where the threat of violence is so big it 
hinders the process of peace building (3.3.2 Functions). In the context analysis (4.1.5.2 The 
Syrian Crisis), it is argued that the Syrian conflict has increased violence in Lebanon. In 
relation to the combats in Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, the CSOs could act as watchdogs or 
create ‘zones of peace’ according to Paffenholz and Spurk’s theory. However, this is not 
something that any of our five interviewees, representing CSOs, claim to be engaged in. 
 
4.2.2 Monitoring 
The CSOs in Lebanon can take up the function as monitors with holding the state accountable 
in relation to important matters on violence or human rights for example (3.3.2 Functions). 
Lebanon has witnessed an increase in violence related to the Syrian crises and is challenged 
by the social consequences of the extremely high number of Syrian refugees. Both the 
refugees themselves and the poorest Lebanese citizens, who are very much affected by the 
refugees, need the state’s protection and help (4.1.5.2 The Syrian Crisis). Through our five 
interviews, we found that it is only Search for Common Ground (SFCG) (ID3), who does 
monitoring. Morgane Ortmans, representing SFCG, explains that they do this by producing 
academic reports. One of these reports, concerning Syrian refugees in Lebanon, tries to 
eliminate Lebanese prejudice against the Syrian refugees (ID3, 4.2: 10:20). This is an 
example of how SFCG tries to address the Syrian crises and monitor the situation as a 
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prerequisite for advocacy and public communication of the challenges related to the high 
number of Syrian refugees. SFCG also use the reports as a basis for their own project 
strategies.  
 
4.2.3 Advocacy and Public Communication 
Advocacy and Public Communication is in gross to put social and political issues on the 
public agenda. This can be through non-public advocacy where the civil society tries to gain 
influence through informal channels, or public advocacy where influence is achieved through 
for example demonstrations, statements and press releases (3.3.2 Functions).  
We found that all of the CSOs work with advocacy and public communication (ID1, 3.; ID2 
3.; ID3 3.; ID4 3.; ID5 3.). Christina Foerch’s (ID5) objective with both Permanent Peace 
Movement (PPM) and Fighters for Peace has been to advocate for memory and reconciliation 
after the civil war. Foerch argues that to avoid violent conflicts in the future it is important for 
all Lebanese people to address the past and engage in an open dialogue about the civil war 
(ID5, 1, I2: 00:40). Fighters for Peace is an initiative with x-fighters from the civil war. The 
x-fighters have very specific expertise and experiences from the war, which is the basis for 
their advocacy. With armed conflict re-occurring in Tripoli (4.1.5.2 The Syrian Crisis), 
Foerch argues for the importance of public communication about memory and reconciliation. 
She hopes that the x-fighters can use non-public advocacy to appeal to current fighters and 
convince them that violent measures are not the solution to the conflict (ID5, 4.2, I3: 33:00).  
 
Adyan’s (ID2) advocacy for a change of the curriculum is an example of non-public 
advocacy. Together with the Ministry of Education, the CSO has changed the curriculum 
from ‘assimilation’ to ‘acceptance of diversity’ and from ‘tolerance’ to ‘equal participation’. 
Nayla Tabbara, representing Adyan, argues that it was important to change the curriculum 
from assimilation to acceptance of diversity because it believes that diversity is an added 
value (ID2, 2: 6:00). Tabbara argues that the curriculum was wrong in promoting tolerance, 
because it has a condescending value that does not promote a real acceptance of the others. 
Adyan changed it to equal participation, because they want the new curriculum to point to 
citizenship and real participation in a modern democracy (ID2, 3.1: 17:30). The change of the 
curriculum is an attempt to bridge the ties between the highly divided Lebanese society, and 
it is closely related to Adyan’s goal of promoting a national identity that can accommodate all 
the different religious communities in the Lebanese society (ID2, 2: 6:00). 
 40 
Thus Adyan has advocated for recognition of religion and diversity as an added value and 
through a non-public dialogue with the Lebanese Ministry of Education has gotten their 
agenda implemented in the curriculum (ID2: 3.1: 17:30). An example of public advocacy 
could be Adyan’s ‘Spiritual Solidarity Day’, which is a yearly event where Adyan arranges 
events for interreligious praying to advocate for interreligious social cohesion (ID2: 3.2: 
27:00).  
  
Christian Muslim Committee of Dialogue (CMCD) (ID 4) uses public communication to 
promote interreligious understanding between the different religious leaders in Lebanon. 
CMCD facilitates a space and framework for a summit between the religious leaders. 
Muhammad Al-Sammak, representing CMCD, explains that the purpose of the summits is to 
form an interreligious common statement, including a strategy to tackle different issues in 
Lebanon (ID4: 3.1: 28:45). CMCD thereby uses facilitation and intermediation in order to get 
the parties to form a joint statement and with this statement, publicly advocate for 
interreligious understanding.  
Another example of advocacy is the implementation of the Annunciation Day. CMCD has 
advocated through informal channels to make the Annunciation Day a public Lebanese 
holiday for both Christians and Muslims. Every year, the holiday marks the similarities 
between the two religions; similarities that CMCD wants to promote in order to fight 
extremism and prejudices (ID4, 3.1: 28:45). Al-Sammak argues that this initiative is 
especially important with the current regional religious tensions (ID2, 6: 15:23). Having a 
national holiday or a spiritual solidarity day can also set the framework for public advocacy 
and communication because it can be used to raise awareness of a social issue, not only once 
but every year on that date.  
 
4.2.4 In-group Socialization 
The purpose of this function is to empower for example marginalised or oppressed groups. 
The goal is to strengthen this group through capacity building and the socialisation of 
democratic attitudes, enabling them to engage constructively in peace building and to be a 
part of the resolution and reconciliation process (3.3.2 Functions). In our five interviews, we 
found that all five of the CSOs focus a lot of their work on in-group socialization on the 
youth (ID1, 4.3 and 4; ID2, 5.1; ID3, 3.3; ID4, 3,3; ID5, 3.1). As mentioned in the context 
analysis, the Lebanese youth constitutes around 42.4 % (4.1.2 The Demographic 
 41 
Composition). Maher Btaiche, representing Forum for Development, Culture and Dialogue 
(FDCD) (ID1), explains that their reason for mainly working with the youth is a combination 
of the youth being more energetic and more likely to act as agents of change (ID1, 4.3: 
06:00). Tabbara has a similar argument: “They can act as role models of empowered young 
Muslims in the West or in the MENA region” (ID 2, 2.2, Tabbara: 34:00). She goes on to 
explaining that youth in the Arab world today is very critical towards status quo, but they 
need to acquire the tools to canalise their frustrations. Adyan tries to provide these tools (ID2, 
2.2, Tabbara: 32:30). Foerch gives yet another reason. She argues that the youth tends to be 
easier manipulated by religious and political leaders. PPM wants the youth to be able to make 
up their own minds about the civil war, to prevent violent conflicts in the future, and this is 
the reason why they focus their work on the youth (ID5, 3.1, 04:40). These three interviewees 
all emphasise the great importance of engaging the youth in the peace building process, and 
we can thereby conclude that there is a specific focus on capacity building and promoting 
‘culture of peace’ (3.3.2 Functions) through in-group socialization of the youth.  
 
4.2.5 Social Cohesion 
Social cohesion plays a vital role in Lederach’s relational approach (3.2 A Relational 
Approach), and Paffenholz and Spurk argue that one of the most important functions of the 
civil society is fostering social cohesion in order to build a community (Paffenholz and Spurk 
2010:71). Social cohesion differs from in-group socialization in that it aims at building a 
unified society through ‘bridging ties’ between former adversary groups. We found that all 
five of the CSOs work with this function, and for some it is their raison d’être (ID2, ID3, 
ID4). Paffenholz and Spurk distinguish between three different approaches to create social 
cohesion. The first one is the relationship-oriented cohesion for peace (3.3.2 Functions). 
Among our interviewees, some of the relationship-oriented projects were: Adyan’s spiritual 
solidarity day (ID2, 3.2: 27:00), Adyans’s non-formal education for high school kids (ID2, 
3.3: 24:00) and CMCD’s youth dialogue (ID4, 3.3: 39:30). What these projects all have in 
common is that the CSOs create a place for adversary groups to meet and develop a better 
understanding of ‘the other’.  
The second approach is outcome-oriented cohesion for peace. In CMCD’s summit, the 
outcome is a general statement that addresses all Lebanese people, and the summit thereby 
reaches further than just the participants (ID4, 3.1: 22:00). Another example is FDCD’s 
program Leaders for Interreligious Understanding (LIU). In this program, FDCD train 
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religious leaders, journalists, civil society leaders etc. in cross-cultural dialogue, in order for 
them to become agents of peace within their own professional environment or local 
community (LIU 11.05.15). The third one is outcome-oriented cohesion with a business or 
development purpose. This approach is applied among our CSOs through projects with 
artistic outcome-oriented purposes. SFCG’s ‘Better Together’ (ID3, 3.2: 06:30) is a project 
where the outcome is an art-project and the side effect is social cohesion. Foerch’s production 
of films, with PPM and Fighters for Peace, was used as an artistic tool to help the high school 
kids to be advocates for a more peaceful society (ID5, 3.2: I2: 00:40).  
 
4.2.6 Intermediation and Facilitation  
The Lebanese CSOs can act as intermediaries or facilitators in three different areas: between 
the state and the civil population, between or among groups or between different levels of 
society (3.3.2 Functions). Our interviewees focus a lot of their work on intermediation or 
facilitation between different sectarian groups (ID1, 4, ID2, 4, ID3, 4, ID4, 4 & ID5, 4). Al-
Sammak explains that they facilitated a meeting between a group of young Christians and a 
group of young Muslims, who took turns visiting each other’s schools. This meeting had a 
positive spill-over effect when the two groups and their families later arranged a second 
meeting on their own initiative (ID4, 3.3: 39:30). Tabbara also explains that facilitating 
meetings between different groups of society, both in relation to their Spiritual Solidarity Day 
and their non-formal education for high school kids, is a key focus in their projects of 
creating social cohesion (ID2, 3.2: 27:00 & ID2, 3.3: 24:00). The function of facilitating 
meetings and dialogue is clearly a main function for our CSOs, and the initiatives are all 
focused on relations between different groups. However, it is only FDCD and CMCD who 
take the role as an intermediator. FDCD does this when mediating between young political 
parties at the university level (ID1, 3: 19:00), and CMCD when they formulate a statement of 
the religious leaders after their summits to use it for public advocacy (ID4, 3.1: 22:00).  
 
4.2.7 Service Delivery 
‘Service Delivery’, is the provision of aid and services (3.3.2 Functions). We found two 
examples of service delivery through our interviews. FDCD uses the function of service 
delivery to reach 800 families, first of all with food supplies, but also with social training, 
trauma healing and social support (ID1: 3: 36:30). Paffenholz and Spurk argue that giving 
food can be a hindrance if it takes away the focus from other important functions (Paffenholz 
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2010: 74). Btaiche argues that FDCD’s family-support programs are not only for the support 
of necessities but accompanied by other kinds of support too (ID1, 3: 36.30). FDCD uses 
service delivery as a tool to reach marginalised groups who do not have many resources. For 
FDCD, supporting them financially is an ‘entry point’ for providing the families with trauma 
healing and conflict resolution training i.e. peace building (3.3.2 Functions). Btaiche argues 
that, “You can not only give food to people” (ID1, 3: Btaiche: 36:30). SFCG also provides 
service delivery in their work with the Syrian refugees. In order to reach their main objective, 
which is to facilitate a place for Syrian and Lebanese to meet, they sometimes engage in 
smaller projects, providing materials to solve a specific problem related to the high amount of 
Syrian refugees. Ortmans explains that in Tripoli the municipality claimed that the amount of 
garbage had tripled with the arrival of Syrians. The municipality asked for a garbage truck to 
help them deal with this problem, and SFCG decided to provide this truck. Ortmans 
emphasises that the only reason SFCG was willing to do this was because the municipal 
leaders together with the citizens had identified this solution. (ID3, 4.1: 28:00). SFCG has 
thereby used service delivery as an entry point for peace building because they made sure, 
that the materials they provided were a part of their main objective, to work with social 
cohesion between Syrian and Lebanese people. In Lebanon, it is generally CSOs with 
political and religious affiliations that use service delivery to keep the support of their 
communities. In fact, this kind of the organisations provide up to 60 % of basic health and 
education services. The state is a weak actor in the area of service delivery (4.1.4 The 
Contemporary Socio-economic Situation), and this leaves a possibility to use service delivery 
as a means to reach marginalised groups, which both FDCD and SFCG exploit. 
 
4.2.8 Partial Conclusion 
The CSOs mainly focus their work on social cohesion, youth in-group socialization, 
intermediation and facilitation as well as advocacy and public communication. The CSOs 
work with social cohesion and facilitation in order to address the internal division in 
Lebanon, a division that stems from Lebanon’s demographic composition, the civil war, the 
Middle East’s regional tensions and the Syrian crises. The CSOs focus a lot of their work on 
developing a culture of peace among the youth, as well as empowering them as a group. 
Through advocacy and public communication, the CSOs try to put memory of the civil war 
and peaceful coexistence on the agenda, both among Lebanese people, and between Lebanese 
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and Syrians in the case of SFCG. In relation to the main problem of the thesis, the analysis 
reflects which actions the CSOs provide to create an arena for peace building in Lebanon.  
 
4.3 Influence in the Peace Building Process 
4.3.1 Middle-range Influence 
In answering our main problem, it is not only necessary to understand through what functions 
CSOs can create an arena for peace building, but also how they can gain influence through 
these functions. It does not matter if a CSO facilitates a dialogue between adversary parties if 
no one shows up. First, we apply John P. Lederach's (1997) middle-range theory to discover 
if our CSOs can represent or empower a linkage between the grass-root level and the top-
level. Hereafter we apply Jeffrey Z. Rubin’s (1992) power theory, reinterpreted by Pamela 
Aall (2007), to analyse how different kinds of power have been used and gained in order to 
obtain influence on the top-level and grass-root level through the functions that the CSOs 
have taken on.  
 
Middle-range Analysis: Can the CSOs Represent the Linkage?  
Looking at the functions outlined above (4.2 Functions in the Peace Building Process), the 
CSOs engage themselves in many aspects of peace building, but if the CSOs want to obtain 
influence on the political level, they need to engage the top-level leaders in their projects. 
Lederach argues that CSOs can act as middle-range leaders when contact with the top-level 
leaders is established (3.2.1 Analytical Framework). The following section features an 
analysis of how the CSOs can establish this contact through the functions outlined above (4.2 
Functions in the Peace Building Process). 
 
Through informal channels, Adyan (ID2) has advocated for a change of the curriculum in 
order to promote their ideas about religion and diversity (4.2.3 Advocacy and Public 
Communication). In this way, they have managed to engage the Ministry of Education in 
changing the curriculum (ID2, 3.1: 17:30), and Nayla Tabbara, representing Adyan, 
highlights the role of the state: 
 
“Civil society can do a great deal if it knows how to enter a partnership with the state. We 
bring the funding, because the state does not have the funding, and we bring the ideas and the 
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work. This is how civil society can actually affect changes on the long term” (ID2, 4.1, 
Tabbara: 39:00). 
 
This is an example of how Adyan has managed to act as a middle-range leader.   
 
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) (ID3) tries to engage the political leaders at the 
municipal level. Morgane Ortmans, representing SFCG, explains: “Ideally it is one of our 
main objectives to strengthen the cooperation with the local level and the capacities to deal 
with the crises” (ID3, 4.1 Ortmans: 28:30). This is not always easy, and Ortmans explains 
that the municipalities often expect SFCG to be something they are not. She argues that there 
are financial problems in the municipalities, and therefore the municipal leaders sometimes 
hope that SFCG can act as a development organisation and provide materials and finances to 
help them with specific issues (ID3, 4.1: 28:00). Ortmans argues that SFCG is a peace 
building organisation and not a developmental organisation. They only want to be involved in 
peace building projects directly related to Syrian-Lebanese issues, but it is not always 
possible to engage the municipal leaders in this. Ortmans explains that they often experience 
that the municipalities do not want to recognise the problems with the Syrian refugees (ID3, 
4.1: 26:00). When SFCG sees a reason for helping with immediate issues because it can help 
in the process of securing a peaceful coexistence between Syrians and Lebanese, they are 
willing to comply with the demands of the municipalities. Through this, SFCG can be a 
middle-range leader when they are able to engage the municipal leaders in SFCG's work 
(ID3, 4.1: 28:00). This is seen, when SFCG managed to use service delivery as an entry point 
for peace building between the Lebanese and the Syrian refugees (4.2.7 Service Delivery).  
 
Lederach also describes two ways in which middle-range leaders can obtain influence: 
problem-solving workshops and conflict resolution training. These methods are used by some 
of our CSOs. When these methods are used, the CSOs do not act as middle-range leaders 
themselves but focus their work on strategically mobilising middle-range leaders in peace 
building. Problem-solving workshops can create a space for informal meetings between 
adversary groups on the mid-level (3.2.1 Analytical Framework). When Christian Muslim 
Committee for Dialogue (CMCD) (ID4) facilitates a religious summit they manage to 
strategically mobilise the Lebanese religious leaders i.e. middle-range leaders, for peace 
building. Their general statement could influence the top-level because the government 
accepts CMCD as a representative committee for all the different religious groups (ID4, 4.1: 
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28:00) (4.2.3 Advocacy and Public Communication). Forum for Development, Culture and 
Dialogue (FDCD) (ID 1) works with conflict resolution training (3.2.1 Analytical 
Framework), in their program, Leaders for Interreligious Understanding (LIU) in order to 
promote social cohesion (4.2.5 Social Cohesion). The aim of this program is to empower and 
engage middle range leaders in peace building. The hope is that they can act as agents for 
peace and thus influence both the top-level and the grass-root level (ID1, 4: 8:15). FCDC thus 
work strategically with empowering the middle-range leaders, because they see them as key 
actors in order to foster reconciliation, integration and political participation (3.2.1 Analytical 
Framework) (LIU 11.05.15). 
 
On the contrary, there are also examples of situations in which the CSOs have not managed 
to create a link to the top-level. Christina Foerch, representing Permanent Peace Movement 
(PPM) (ID 5) explains:  
 
“This is really what needs to change, even though we reached 22-23.000 students [with the 
memory and reconciliation filmmaking project], we did not manage to reach the politicians, 
though sometimes political parties invite us to talk about our project, but we haven’t really 
been able to initiate a change on the political level, so this is really what is missing” (ID5, 6.1 
Foerch: I2 09:30). 
 
This shows, that even though PPM might have managed to initiate a change among the high 
schools kids who participated in their project PPM did not manage to reach the political level. 
In relation to the functions taken on by the CSOs, it appears that if they are not able to use 
informal channels to advocate for their case, it is difficult to reach the top-level. Foerch 
argues that you need to have a personal relation with the political leaders to engage them in 
projects (ID5, 4.2 Foerch: I3 35:15).  
 
Middle-range and Power   
Based on the above examples and conclusion, this section will try to understand how the 
CSOs have been able to engage the top-level in their peace building projects.  
 
As outlined in the function analysis, Adyan has advocated for acceptance of diversity and 
equal participation in schools (4.2.3 Advocacy and Public Communication) and has managed 
to gain support from both UNESCO and the American Embassy (ID2, 7: 58:32).  The 
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recognition and support from these powerful actors have given them a legitimate power as a 
CSO, when it comes to influence on the Lebanese top-level in their educational policy. Their 
work with intercultural citizenship in schools has furthermore established them as an expert 
power, which also adds to their ability to persuade the Ministry of Education to cooperate 
with them. Thus Adyan can use legitimate and expert power (3.4 The Power of Nonofficial 
Actors), to be able to use informal channels to advocate for change. In regards to changing 
the curriculum, Tabbara representing Adyan, argues that Adyan could not have done this 
without the Ministry of Education (ID2, 5.1: 46:40). This is interesting, because Adyan has 
done all the work; they brought the knowledge, they brought the funding and they did the 
actual work e.g. the training of teachers, engaging schools etc. Still, they did not have the 
power to change the curriculum themselves because they did not have any legislative 
authority. On the other hand, Adyan did compose a reward power because they were able to 
fund the project themselves. We argue that this can be seen as a reward for the state because 
when they enter into a partnership with Adyan, they also partly gain control over the funding. 
 
To some extent, this reward power is also found in the work of SFCG. As mentioned above, 
SFCG has experienced increasing interest from the municipal leaders when SFCG deliver 
services. Service delivery can thereby be seen as a reward power, because the municipalities 
are persuaded with a reward to engage in SFCG’s project. SFCG can leverage their reward 
power, when they agree to reward the municipality, and thereby get them engaged in their 
peace building work between the Syrians and Lebanese people. 
 
In relation to the middle-range analysis, CMCD has a legitimate power in facilitating the 
religious summits. CMCD leverage their legitimate power when they host the informal 
religious summit among the religious leaders and ask them to discuss the current situation of 
Lebanon. CMCD thereby exercises “the right to ask them to reframe the terms of the 
conflict” (Aall 2007: 486). CMCD’s legitimate power thus consists of their ability to act as a 
‘midwife’ for the joint statement that the religious leaders formulate. Al-Sammak, 
representing CMCD, explains that the government values CMCD as a representative body of 
the religious communities in Lebanon, and CMCD can thereby gain a referent power (3.4 The 
Power of Nonofficial Actors). CMCD can exercise this referent power and hope to influence 
the politicians through the joint statement. 
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In the LIU program, FDCD try to empower middle-range leaders to be agents for change for 
the future. In this program FDCD train the middle-range leaders in social cohesion and 
religious diversity management. Thereby they gain an expert power and a legitimate power 
that they can leverage to do peace building within and between pluralistic societies. 
In relation to PPM not being able to engage the political leaders in their project on memory 
and reconciliation, Foerch’s, argument about the importance of a personal relation proposes 
that it is crucial to have a referent power to influence the top-level. By not being able to 
engage the political level on memory and reconciliation, PPM did not have this referent 
power.   
 
4.3.2 Grass-root Influence 
In the analysis above, we try to understand, what powers the CSOs can gain and use when 
they want to involve top-level leaders, whereas this part will try to understand what powers 
the CSOs can gain and use in relation to their work with peace building on a grass-root level. 
 
The Power of Research 
Ortmans, representing SFCG, emphasises that the use of research is of great importance in 
SFCG’s projects. SFCG uses research, when they take on the function of monitoring. As 
mentioned in the analysis above (4.2.2 Monitoring) the function of monitoring can be of great 
importance, when SFCG wants to put issues e.g. violations of human rights of Syrian 
refugees, on the agenda. It can be argued that different forms of power are used in the attempt 
to gain influence with monitoring (3.3.2 Functions). Ortmans explains how SFCG did a 
conflict scan where they asked the Lebanese to give examples of situations, where Syrian 
refugees had taken their jobs. The result showed that none of them could name a specific 
situation (ID3: 4.2: 10:20). 
Through this conflict scan, SFCG gained information that can break down the negative 
stereotyping of the Syrian refugees and help foster a peaceful relationship between the 
Lebanese and the Syrians. Thus, the conflict scan supplies them with an informational power. 
Furthermore, this informational power can be used to gain legitimate power. 
Aall argues that non-official organisations can have a legitimate power when re-shaping the 
terms of the conflict (3.4 The Power of Nonofficial Actors). To use Aall’s term, SFCG can 
through their informational power gain the legitimacy to reframe the conflict between the 
Syrians and the Lebanese by persuading the parties to rethink their attitudes toward each 
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other, which can thereby lead to a dialogue between the parties.  
When the Syrians started to flee to Lebanon, the response was mainly focused on 
humanitarian aid. Ortmans criticises the emergency response programs for only focusing on 
humanitarian aid (ID3, 5.1: 47:00), and argues that humanitarian aid is only one part of the 
solution to the Syrian refugee crisis, and only focusing on this one aspect can cause even 
more problems. When humanitarian aid is given to the Syrian refugees, the poor Lebanese 
also feel that they are in the need of support (ID3, 5.1: 48:20). These sort of tensions between 
Syrians refugees and, mainly poor, Lebanese are on the rise. Ortmans explains that Human 
Rights Watch has made reports of how hostilities and discrimination of Syrian refugees has 
been rising (ID3, 5.1: 09:45). Human Rights Watch monitors these developments to put them 
on the national or international agenda. SFCG can use these reports to legitimise their work 
with social stability.  This of cause is based on the assumption that Human Rights Watch and 
their report are seen as legitimate. 
 
The diversity of expertise 
Ortmans explains that SFCG brings their experience from other countries when they 
formulate new projects and then readjust them with the local communities to fit the local 
settings. Ortmans explains that they select most of their projects based on experiences from 
other countries (ID3, 4.4: 47:30). Thus, SFCG gains expert power, because they are able 
draw on their knowledge from other, similar situations. Fighters for Peace also use expert 
power, and Foerch, representing Fighters for Peace, explains that the x-fighters in Fighters for 
Peace have gotten attention from both the media and the politicians (ID5, 4.2: I3: 33:00). As 
Aall argues non-official actors or organisations can gain expert power from sharing similar 
experiences with the conflicting parties (3.4 The Power of Nonofficial Actors). Fighters for 
Peace have specific experience because they have been in the civil war, and they can thereby 
argue for memory and reconciliation and advocate for not repeating the mistakes of the civil 
war. They are the ones who were parties in the civil war and made the mistakes that they do 
not want repeated. 
  
Using Service Delivery for Change 
Both SFCG and FDCD use service delivery to provide incentives for change in behaviour 
between different groups in the Lebanese society. In relation to the theory of power, Aall 
argues that non-official organisations are weak, when it comes to deployment of reward and 
coercive power because they do not have sufficient material resources (3.4 The Power of 
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Nonofficial Actors). She argues that there is little they can do to force a change in behaviour 
on “war-hardened parties” (Aall 2007: 486). Where SFCG works with service delivery on a 
middle-range level (4.3.1 Middle-range Influence), FDCD works on the grass-root level. 
FDCD takes on the function of service delivery, providing food and necessities to 800 
families while also providing incentives for dialogue and skill building (3.3.2 Functions). 
Paffenholz and Spurk define the use of service delivery as an entry point for peace building 
(3.3.2 Functions). This can be described as a reward power (3.4 The Power of Nonofficial 
Actors). FDCD uses service delivery to offer a positive benefit in exchange for compliance in 
other programs that FDCD offers. Service delivery is thereby used as a reward power to 
influence the supported families and engaging them in the peace building process. 
 
4.3.3 Partial Conclusion 
There is no arena for peace building if the CSOs are not able to engage the targeted parties. 
The analysis try to understand what powers the CSOs need to posses to engage the targeted 
parties on both top-level and grass-root level to have an influence on the peace building 
process. We find that the CSOs possess some powers that strengthen their position, but there 
are also some obstacles for CSOs in order to create an arena for peace building. First and 
foremost, the CSOs struggle in order to engage the state. Through the analysis above, we can 
argue that the CSOs need to establish a referent power if the top-level are to value their 
relationship with the CSOs. SFCG struggles to persuade the municipality leaders about the 
importance of their social stability program, and it tries to use reward power through the 
function of service delivery as an entry-point for their project. We also argue that Adyan use 
reward power when they bring funding to the change of the curriculum. In the CSOs work on 
a grass-root level, they find it easier to have influence and thereby create an arena for peace 
building. SFCG’s uses monitoring in order to gain informational power and legitimate power 
to reframe the conflict. Fighters for Peace uses expert power to reach the conflicting parties 
and FDCD uses service delivery and reward power to reach marginalized groups. Aall (2007) 
argues that non-official organisations are weak when it comes to the deployment of reward 
and coercive power because they do not have sufficient material resources, but in the case of 
SFCG, Adyan and FDCD they are able to use reward power because they do have the 
sufficient material resources on a small scale. These examples show us that the CSOs can 
obtain influence in the peace building process, but in relation to our main problem there are 
challenges at the same time. 
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5. Discussion 
The causal explanation of this thesis (function + influence → arena) outlines that CSOs have 
the possibility of creating an arena for peace building when they have an influence through 
their functions. To understand how CSOs can create an arena for peace building in Lebanon, 
it is crucial to understand the enabling and disabling environment for peace building of the 
civil society in Lebanon. In the previous analysis, we have examined the enabling factors, 
and this section will discuss the disabling factors for peace building. These factors are 
challenges for the CSOs in the peace building process. 
 
The Limitations of Short-term Work with Long-term Objectives 
The CSOs face internal capacity challenges related to the context of working with peace 
building in Lebanon. These challenges are something that most of the interviewees articulate. 
Nayla Tabbara, representing Adyan, argues that because Adyan’s work is mostly project-
based, it is a challenge to create coherence between the projects on the long-term (ID2, 6: 
49:00). In BRD’s (2015) report on the Lebanese civil society, this challenge is also evident. 
51,63 % of the CSOs who have an organisational mission does not see a coherence between 
their overall mission and their activities. In addition to this, over 50 % of the Lebanese CSOs 
lack a three-year strategy (BRD 2015: 74-78). Marie-Noëlle Abi Yaghi10 (2012) argues that 
this challenge does not only cause incoherence: 
 
“[...] One of the main shortcomings of the NGOs’ collective actions has been that they have 
tended to be short-term and project-oriented rather than strategic, which means that they 
depend on specific budget lines and the requirements and limitations of donors, who often 
have their own agendas” (Abi Yaghi 2012: 22).  
  
Thus, Abi Yaghi argues that the short-term focus creates another challenge because CSOs 
become dependent on their donors. Christina Foerch, representing PPM and Fighters for 
Peace, follows this notion when she defines the CSO’s environment as ‘a system driven by 
money’ where finances are essential in order to reach change (ID5, 6.3: I3 03:21). The fact 
that funding is a scarce resource creates another challenge. Foerch argues that competition for 
funding is a big problem. In order to save time and resources when applying for funding, the 
                                                 
10 Marie-Noëlle Abi Yaghi is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-
Sorbonne, and an research associate at Institut Francais du Proche-Orient (Institut Francais du Proche-
Orient 24.05.2015) 
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CSOs copy each other’s programs and approaches to peace building. This result in a 
clustering of CSOs work that might narrow their reach and thus stand in the way for the 
CSOs’ effectiveness in reaching the overall objective of peace building (ID5, 6.5: I3 17:50). 
Morgane Ortmans, representing SFCG, explains that this is caused by a lack of coordination 
between the different CSOs (ID3, 6.1: 17:00). Ortmans argues that the state should be able to 
do the coordination, but that it is neither willing nor able to do this (ID3, 6.1: 24:00). The 
regional instability can be another problem when the CSOs try to make long-term plans. 
Maher Btaiche, representing FDCD, argues that because the security situation constantly 
changes, the CSOs constantly have to face new challenges (ID1, 6.3: 10:45). Currently, the 
Syrian crisis is a factor that has proven to create a spill-over of violence and insecurity in 
Lebanon (4.1.5.2 The Syrian Crisis). This has caused CSOs to change their strategies to deal 
with the crisis (ID1, 6.3; ID3, 2.) 
 
Peace Building in a Confessional System 
In the attempt to try to create an arena for peace building in Lebanon, the CSOs are facing 
challenges because of the confessional system. In this thesis, the definition of peace building 
is based on Lederach (1997) and his idea about the necessity of including all level of society, 
especially empowering the middle-range level (3.2.1 Analytical Framework). It is not about 
bottom up or top down, but bottom-up and top-down, i.e. how to incorporate all levels of 
society in the peace building process. Our analysis proposes that it is difficult to include the 
whole Lebanese society, especially the political level. All interviewees agree that one of the 
most profound challenges for peace building in Lebanon is the confessional system (ID1, 6.1; 
ID2, 6; ID3, 6.2; ID4, 5.2; & ID5, 6.2). However, a disagreement exists between our 
interviewees over whether it is the role of the civil society to change the system.  
 
Btaiche argues that the system of confessionalism is far from perfect, but that it brings 
stability, and that the CSOs should direct their work towards a mentality change, rather than a 
system change. He believes that changing the system is not the responsibility of the civil 
society (ID1, 6.1: 29:00). This view is supported by Tabbara, who argues that changing the 
mentality, perception and vision of the Lebanese population will lead to a sustainable peace 
(ID2, 5.1: 54:20), but for this change to happen, the state needs to be engaged in the process 
(ID2, 4.1: 39:00). Our analysis proposes that PPM has not been able to engage the top-level 
leaders in memory and reconciliation process (4.3.1 Middle-range Influence). Foerch 
explains that to influence this level, you need to do person-to-person lobbying, and she has 
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not been able to do that (ID 5, 4.2, I3: 35:15). This is also a conclusion in the BRD report: 
“any engagement with policy makers relies today, on personal connections of civil society 
actors rather than on clear legal and institutional mechanism with policy makers” (BRD 
2015: 100). Janine A. Clark and Bassel F. Salloukh11 argue that when the sectarian elite co-
opt with CSOs, they are infiltrating and controlling the CSOs in a way that prevents these 
from fulfilling their natural role as agents of political and socioeconomic change (Clark and 
Salloukh 2013: 744). This means that when the CSOs co-opt with the sectarian elite i.e. the 
government, it could “serve to reproduce sectarian identities and a general post-war ‘culture 
of sectarianism’ that enables the sectarian elite to safeguard their political power and 
socioeconomic interests” (Ibid.). Abi Yaghi puts this in another perspective: 
 
“Neither the Lebanese state nor civil society provides an arena in which citizens can claim 
their rights or hold sectarian leaders to account. At a time when sectarian ties define citizens’ 
participation in politics, civil society activists have learnt that sectarian leaders will only 
support or represent agendas that do not challenge their hegemony, or that contribute to 
consolidating their patronage networks.” 
 
Thus, she also highlights the power and control the sectarian leaders hold over the Lebanese 
civil society, which defines some limitations for the work of the CSOs. This might explain 
one of the reasons why PPM was challenged in gaining political support for their memory 
and reconciliation program because as Sune Haugbølle12 argues, memory and reconciliation 
is a sensitive subject in Lebanon, and it has never been publicly debated (Haugbølle 2012: 
15). Still the memory and reconciliation project did manage to reach many people through 
education in high schools, but Foerch still argues that this cannot stand alone, there needs to 
be public debate and a change of the system: 
 
“This system [confessional system] bears the roots of conflict in the system. We don’t think 
that changing the system will rip up old wounds, on the contrary. If you manage to implement 
                                                 
11 Janine A. Clark is an associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Guelph, Guelph in Canada (University of Guelph, 24.05.2015); and Bassel F. Salloukh is an Associate 
Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Lebanese American University in Beirut, 
Lebanon (Lebanese American University, 24.05.2015). .  
 
12 Sune Haugbølle is lector at Institute for Society and Globalization at Roskilde University, Denmark 
(Roskilde University, 24.05.2015).  
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a civilian state, a non-sectarian state, this should actually be the basis for sustainable peace” 
(ID5, 6.2, I3: Foerch: 05:30). 
 
Thus, the system has some inherent challenges that the CSOs struggle to overcome. The end 
of the civil war and the Ta’if agreement placed a lot of power on a small political elite (1.1 
Problem Area). Fawwas Traboulsi13 argues that in order to sustain the system and secure their 
own positions, they use the sectarian divide to their own advantage and to mobilize support 
among their respective communities (Traboulsi 2012: 29). This division is hard to change, 
Foerch explains:  
 
“Everyone wants to have a normal life, and sustain a normal life. The problem in Lebanon is, 
that everyone in Lebanon criticises the political system, but when it comes to the elections, 
they all vote for them, because they think, that the confessional leaders and clan leaders will 
protect their families and communities ” (ID 5, 6.2, I3: Foerch: 04:00).  
 
Although, most people agree that the system is problematic in theory, this does not reflect in 
their behaviour. This is a hindrance for the ability of the CSOs to create social cohesion and 
reconciliation. Thereby it presents yet another challenge in the CSOs attempt to create an 
arena for peace building.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Fawwas Traboulsi is a Visiting Professor of History and Politics at the American University Beirut 
in Lebanon and a journalist for the Bidayat journal (American University Beirut, 24.05.2015). 
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6. Conclusion 
To answer our main problem, we chose to divide the thesis into two parts. We argue that the 
five CSOs can try to influence the peace building process on two levels; a political level and 
a grass-root level, but to create an arena for peace building, the CSOs need to engage all 
levels of society in the process. The CSOs use almost a full scale of functions to create an 
arena for peace building. Through these functions, the CSOs deploy all powers, except 
coercive power, to gain influence in the process. Despite this, the CSOs struggle to engage 
the political level because this can only be done when the CSOs use a reward or a referent 
power. The CSOs’ are challenged with deploying these powers because they are based 
respectively on a control of funds that many of the CSOs do not have and on a person-to-
person relation that is hard to establish. It is easier to engage the grass-root level in peace 
building, but even on this level, the CSOs struggle. However, we can conclude that when the 
CSOs incorporate strategic use of their powers e.g. Adyan’s curriculum change, SFCG’s 
social stability project, CMCD’s religious summit and FDCD’s LIU program they have a 
better chance to gain influence through their functions. Thus, when the CSOs strategically 
plan which powers to leverage in the different projects to reach all levels of society, they are 
able to create an arena for peace building instead of simply providing a function. Thereby we 
can conclude that the majority of the CSOs manage to create an arena for peace building, but 
only when they are strategic. Despite this, all of the CSOs highlight that they are facing many 
challenges, and that the confessional system is the most profound. We conclude that the 
confessional system works against the CSOs efforts to create a sustainable peace in Lebanon 
because it supports the sectarian divide. Furthermore, we find that addressing sensitive 
subjects, which could initiate system changes, is very difficult. The confessional system was 
always meant to be dissolved over time because it was only meant to work as short-term 
solution to end the civil war.  
 
We conclude that the confessional system works against the CSOs efforts to create a 
sustainable peace in Lebanon. The CSOs can meet this challenge if they manage to 
incorporate their powers strategically in their functions to reach all levels of society. Only in 
this way, can the CSOs create an arena for peace building in Lebanon. 
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7. Methodological Discussion 
In this section, we will reflect upon our chosen methods and theoretical choices, and the 
conclusion that these methods have lead us to. By choosing to do a single case study based on 
interviews as our primary empirical data, we are aware that we cannot generalize our 
conclusions. Furthermore, we are aware that by using interviews our empirical data is based 
on opinions and not facts, and that by asking other questions or having other interviewees, 
other conclusions could have been drawn. Because we use theory of peace building from the 
conflict transformation and conflict resolution school as the basis of our analysis, our analysis 
is focused on empowering the civil society. This choice of theory can answer our main 
problem, but we are also aware that this theoretical framework does not include any negative 
consequences of empowering CSOs. 
Our theoretical framework has posed some challenges. These challenges are related to the 
functions analysis and power analysis. In the analysis, one of the functions that Adyan 
stressed the importance of proved that Paffenholz & Spurk's theoretical framework of 
functions was not sufficient. Adyan was creating an accredited institute for education on 
Islamic affairs and politics, which did not fit into the categories outlined by Paffenholz and 
Spurk, and for this reason, we did not include it in our analysis. Another reason is, that the 
institute has not yet been accredited, and we can thereby not analyse on the possibility of 
influence through this function. Another challenge that we faced was in the application of 
Aall and Rubin’s power theory. In situations where a function did not lead to an influence, it 
was not possible to argue what powers the CSOs did or did not posses. This was for instance 
a problem when analysing why Permanent Peace Movement did not manage to engage the 
political level. Thereby we can only conclude that neither the function nor the power was 
sufficient to gain influence in the peace building process.  
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8. Perspective 
In this thesis, we add to the theory of peace building and civil society when testing the 
combination of our theories. There is a knowledge gap in this field even though more and 
more scholars argue for the importance of civil society in the process of peace building (1.1 
Problem Area). They expect the civil society to play a more active role and initiate the 
changes needed to create a sustainable peace. In the Middle Eastern context, this is of cause 
also related to the failed attempts to create a sustainable peace in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Libya. The international coalitions in these conflicts have not been able to secure a stable 
future in these countries, and this has also added to the notion that internal actors and 
especially the civil society need to play a more vital role. Lebanon is in many ways a success 
story; it is a democracy, it is somewhat stable (compared to the rest of the region), and it has 
a vast and lively civil society. Still we argue that this is not enough to prevent the outbreak of 
another violent conflict in Lebanon because the changes has not reached the political level. 
Therefore, the civil society cannot play the game-changing role scholars expect it to. It is 
only through cooperation with the top-level that real change can happen. This is also highly 
interesting in relation to the special Lebanese system. The confessional system might be a 
solution in other Middle Eastern countries tormented by civil war. It could be applied to as a 
conflict management tool to end violence, but the Lebanese example shows that in order to 
obtain a sustainable peace, it has to have an expiration date. We suggest that further research 
could elaborate on the role of the civil society in peace building in the Middle Eastern region.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
1. Interview Display: Maher Btaiche Representing Forum for Development, Culture 
and Dialogue (FDCD)  
 
Interviewed: Maher Btaiche, Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Program Coordinator, 
representing FDCD. 
Interviewers: Luna Mariager, Josefine Jesta Lilja Jensen and Marie Bechgaard  
Wednesday the 1th of April at 11 a.m., at his office in Beirut, Lebanon 
 
1. Introduction (00.18) 
Forum for Development, Culture and Dialogue (FDCD) was founded as the Urban Rural Mission 
during the civil war. In 2004 it became FDCD. FDCD is a local organization placed in Beirut, but has 
a Middle East regional overlook. FDCD works to promote equal citizenship and human rights, by 
creating a common space for dialogue and capacity building for conflict resolution (FDCD 
25.05.2015). 
FDCD has developed a peacebuilding strategy in the Middle East, with a main focus on Lebanon. 
FDCD is a NGO that operates mainly in Lebanon, but has peacebuilding activities all over the Arab 
Region (02:10). Most of FDCD’s activities are focused on young people around the Arab World. 
Furthermore, they also work at the international level, by for example working with the Danish 
organisation Danmission and when hosting Youth Camps with young people, participating from all 
over the world (02:20).  
 
2. Main Objectives 
Btaiche explains that FDCD’s overall goal is to secure a sustainable civil peace for the future (09:25). 
Btaiche argues, that civil peace is the main aim of FDCD, which contains a respect of human rights 
and diversity. FDCD’s work in Lebanon is focused on reconciliation after the civil war and tackling 
the current situation of growing extremism. FDCD’s work with the youth in Syria focuses especially 
on emergency response and reconciliation, through dialogue between different participants and 
through empowering the youth in Syria (03:50).  
 
FDCD focuses on building bridges between people, and creating a society of sustainable peace, 
through dialogue. FDCD mainly focus on dialogue between different counterparts, especially between 
Christians and Muslims (00:42). 
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Btaiche argues that the Lebanese society is not only fragmented by political or religious views, but 
also by geography. FDCD works to bring these groups together to learn about each others culture. 
Btaiche argues, that this will reduce the tension between the groups, enhance the belonging to the 
country, and enabling the people to cooperate for a peaceful future (08:25). 
 
3. Projects  
FDCD has three different programs: The Citizenship and Human Rights Program, the Peacebuilding 
and Conflict Resolution Program and the Emergency Response Program. The Emergency Response 
program started in 2006 during the war with Israel and now has the objective of dealing with the 
current Syrian crisis. 
The programs vary from country to country depending on the needs. In Syria, FDCD is mainly 
focused on the Emergency Response Program, but also on the dialogue perspective. Some of the 
Emergency Response Program is also focused in Lebanon. In both Lebanon and Syria FDCD works 
on training youth in how to respond to emergency and on developing a vision of citizenship. This will 
serve as tools and a vision for the Arab World, where citizens can be supported in a democratic way 
and change the whole situation to a sustainable civil peace (00:40). 
Concrete projects 
 Training in citizenship 
 Hiking for peace 
 Cycling for peace 
 Football-matches 
 Youth Camps 
 Training religious leaders and leaders from the political system 
 Mediation between young people in political parties at the university 
 LIU (Leaders for Interreligious understanding) (19:00) 
 Support to 800 families, social support, trauma healing, conflict resolution training and food. 
Btaiche argues: “You can not only give food to people” (Btaiche 36:30). 
 Media strategy: Apeace, application to coordinate civil society activities. 
 
4. Methods 
FDCD mainly focuses on dialogue, icebreaking and building bridges. To reach the main objective of 
civil peace, FDCD works with citizenship and dialogue (08:15). It is a long-term strategy and 
therefore has a long-term impact. FDCD use the theory of Lederach, and start at the lowest level of 
the pyramid (18:00). But Btaiche argues that FDCD has changed their approach to a more circular 
process. They aim to reach the top-level of society, but involve the grass-root level in this process, 
everyone will get involved in the process. 
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4.1 Dialogue (21:30) 
FDCD focuses on the method of dialogue in reaching their goals. Btaiche argues that dialogue is the 
best way for adversary groups to meet at the same level, and to learn to cooperate and think together. 
An example of this is FDCD’s LIU program, where the youth is trained to be actors of peace in 
Lebanon. Btaiche argues, that doing different activities is fine, but it is in the cooperation, dialogue 
and preparation for different activities, that a change in the mindset of the youth can happen.  
 
4.2 Training in Citizenship (05:00) 
Btaiche explains, that FCDS’s understanding of citizenship is based on the citizen’s role in society. 
Citizenship is where everyone is respected and respects the right of the other. Btaiche argues, that it is 
important to keep and respect religious diversity, as well as to think that diversity is a richness and not 
a cause for war or fragmentation. Based on this, FDCD develops activities and projects, and train 
participants to go back to their countries or communities and promote citizenship by using the skills 
they have learned. 
 
4.3 In-group Socialisation: Why Youth? (06:00) 
FDCD works with developing skills of the youth. Btaiche argues that FDCD mainly focuses on youth 
because they are the most energetic level of society. He argues that if FDCD wants to promote change 
for the future, it is best to focus on the youth. In Lebanon the main focus is on the youth because they 
have not been directly affected by the war, because they didn’t live during the war, but they are the 
most affected indirectly by the civil war. Btaiche explains, that FDCD works with youth to develop a 
new strategy for the future. 
 
5. Others 
5.1 Measuring Success 
Btaiche argues, that the success of FDCD’s programs cannot be measured, because FDCD focus on a 
long-term impact (09:55). He explains: 
 
“That it is not after one week of workshops, that we can see peace in the country, and also, as I said in 
the beginning, we focus on healing the wounds of the civil war, but facing the extremist situation right 
now. Which is also creating new kinds of clashes” (Btaiche 10:15). 
 
He explains the situation by using the metaphor, that Lebanon is like a sick person, and you are 
healing his sickness, but the person keeps getting more viruses. The new viruses are not direct, and 
you cannot track the cause (10:35). Btaiche argues, that it is a process and that FDCD believes that 
focusing on the process is better than on results. Btaiche argues that there are always direct results: 
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“You get a group, you train them by developing certain skills and you can see how these skills are 
successful in a certain context” (10:10). 
 
6. Challenges 
6.1 Changing the System or the Mentality? 
Btaiche argues that CSOs cannot change the system, only the mentality and skill set of the people. 
This is how FDCD works, and what they create their programs after. 
Btaiche argues that even though 100% of the Lebanese people say that the system is not functioning, 
the confessional system brings stability (29:15). He argues that if you don’t have a perfect solution for 
a new system, it is better to accept the system as it is, and instead work on changing the people in the 
system (30:30). FDCD focuses on getting people to accept the president, even if he is from another 
party (29:00). Btaiche underlines that the laws of the system are fine, but the crucial part is how to 
apply them, and this is where there is a challenge (Btaiche 01.04.2015: 20.30). He explains, that 
FDCD works with other NGOs that are working on changing the law, for example for women’s rights 
(34:00). FDCD works on changing attitudes, not the system or the law. Btaiche says, that changing 
the system is difficult, also because the Lebanese politicians are not even able to elect a president 
(Btaiche 01.04.2015: 35.25). Btaiche believes that it is not the role of the civil society to change the 
system, but that some people disagree (Btaiche 01.04.2015: 31.00). He argues, that if you believe that 
changing the system is the purpose of the civil society it will fail, and to make a revolution is out of 
the question. FDCD can have an impact on the peacebuilding process by supporting the civil society 
and changing it. Btaiche believes that the civil society can do that on a big scale (32:25). 
 
6.2 The Impact of the Civil War 
Btaiche argues that the civil war is the root cause to all issues that Lebanon faces today (07:15).  
 
“The story of the civil war is very strange. The civil war started and ended after 15 years without 
having any kind of reconciliation. So after this people slept and woke up after 15 years, and went back 
to work together” (Btaiche 07:25). 
 
Btaiche argues, that this has affected the country from 1990 to 2015, because the Lebanese society did 
not heal the wounds, and are still suffering from them today (07:50). 
 
6.3 Security 
Btaiche argues that the biggest challenge for obtaining peace in Lebanon is the security threat. The 
security situation always changes (11:30). 
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“I always give this example, it is a copy-right example: It is like we are dealing with the HIV/AIDS 
virus. It is not a normal flu virus, where you can know the shape and put the antidote and make a 
solution. It is like the HIV virus it changes, the shape continues to change because of the security 
situation. We don’t know at what time or what place, what will happen to change our strategy” 
(Btaiche 10:45). 
 
Btaiche argues that extremism is the new big security challenge, and that no one could have foreseen 
that extremism would take this form (12:10). Extremism, in his view, is all groups that now, more 
than ever, are promoting their extremist views without respecting human rights (12:55). He argues, 
that the challenge is not Sunni-Shia, because even if there are clashes between them, they still respect 
human rights (13:25). 
“When we say extremism we talk about ISIS, Al-Nusra and these groups that are involved in terrorist 
acts, as we define terrorist acts, not as in the West unfortunately. And these terrorist acts are affecting 
the whole Middle East” (14:10). 
Btaiche argues that not every act is a terrorist act, like the west claims.  
 
“We don't say that every act is terrorist right now. Not like with the media and politicians, blaming a 
whole group of people or a whole society for being terrorists, this is what we don’t agree with. Every 
war is terrorism. But the problem is right now, can we make a difference between extremism and 
terrorism?”(Btaiche 14:45).  
 
In Btaiche view, it is not constructive to talk about every extremist group as a terrorist group. He 
argues that extremism gives a more appropriate name to the groups that pursue an extreme Islamist 
ideology (15:50). 
Btaiche believes that in dealing with the current security problem, the state has a big role, but the state 
is not the problem. The problem is extremists doing terrorist acts with religious aims (16:20). 
 
7. Funding 
FDCD take private donations, but big donations are project based and comes from the international 
society.  
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Appendix 2 
2. Interview Display: Nayla Tabbara Representing Adyan Foundation  
 
Interviewed: Nayla Tabbara, Director of the Cross-Cultural Studies department 
Interviewers: Marie Bechgaard Madsen, Josefine Jesta Lilja Jensen & Luna Mariager 
Tuesday the 7th of April 2015 at 11 a.m. at her office in Beirut, Lebanon. 
 
1. Introduction  
Adyan is a Lebanese foundation for interreligious studies and spiritual solidarity and it was founded 
by members from Christian and Muslim denominations in August 2006. Adyan is an independent 
organization that operates in Lebanon and abroad, regionally and internationally. Adyan is registered 
in Lebanon as a non-profit and non-governmental organization (NGO), under registration number 
1103 by a ministerial decree dated 18 September 2008.  
Adyan envisions a world where diversity between individuals and communities is lived as an 
enrichment, generating mutual understanding, intercultural citizenship, creative development, 
sustainable peace and spiritual solidarity (Adyanvillage 12.05.15) 
 
2. Main Objectives  
Adyan is a religious based foundation, which work for recognition of religion and diversity as an 
added value, both on a personal level and on a social/political level.  
 
“On a personal level “the other”, who is different from me, is an added value, because I learn about 
him, but I also learn from him, about myself so I also grow as a person. On a social and political level, 
the diversity as an added value, play an important role for the national identity, for the heritage, and 
for the patrimony of the country […] People should be at ease with their different belongings under 
one national identity.” (Tabbara 06:00) 
 
Religion can play a positive role in securing reconciliation and peacebuilding. It is not possible to put 
religion aside in a society such as Lebanon, and Lebanon must use its diversity as strength, rather than 
a weakness (08:00). 
 
2.1 The Three Different Sections 
Adyan work on three different areas: academia, community and media. The academic area is now 
focused on an institute, The Cross-Cultural Studies Department (CCSC) that develops ideas and skills 
and does capacity building. The community is more practical and in the community projects Adyan 
try to live the values.  In the media area Adyan has just recently intensified their work. Tabbara 
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explains that social media is playing a very important role today, in the Arab context especially ISIS 
has been able to promote themselves through social media, and therefore Adyan has decided to 
improve their media strategy (16:00).  
 
2.2 Academia  
Adyan is creating an institute where they give courses, training and academic courses. Until recently, 
they have not been able to give their own accreditation, but Tabbara hopes that this will change now, 
when the Ministry of Education legally recognizes the institute. This will give Adyan the possibility 
to offer a bachelor or a master that combines religion with political affairs.  
 
“We think there is a need for BA, and even more for MA, in religion and political affairs, or for 
example Islam and questions of violence and peacebuilding or Islam and the state. These are subjects, 
that we are well equipped to tackle” (Tabbara 32:30). 
 
Tabbara hopes that the graduates can act as agents for social change in Lebanon. With the knowledge 
they gather in Islamic affairs, they are able to stand up to religious authorities and propose different 
interpretations of the Quran. “They can act as role models of empowered young Muslims in the West 
or in the MENA region” (Tabbara 34:00).  
 
3. Projects  
3.1 Changing the Curriculum 
Under the banner of “Intercultural Citizenship Education”, Adyan has managed to change the 
curriculum for school kids. Together with the Ministry of Education Adyan has changed some of the 
core concepts in the curriculum from ‘assimilation’, to ‘acceptance of diversity’ and from ‘tolerance’ 
to ‘equal participation’. Adyan strongly disagrees with promoting assimilation, since assimilation is 
the exact opposite of accepting cultural diversity. They also believe that tolerance holds a negative 
and condescending value that is not suitable for a modern democracy and does not foster participating 
citizens. The change of the curriculum included both changing the schoolbooks, but also training the 
teachers, so they are able to promote the new curriculum. But it is not enough to only work with the 
schools, also religious leaders needs to be a part of this. Religious education does not belong under the 
Ministry of Education, and therefore they are not bound to the curriculum. Usually the religious 
education talk about the relationship with God and the relationship with others from the same faith, 
but Adyan wants the religious schools to address the relationship between individuals and the state. 
Religious education also needs to be able to teach its students how to be a good citizen. The program 
has been a huge success and now the graduates want to carry on the work and some of them have 
become volunteers in Adyan (17:30).  
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3.2 Spiritual Solidarity Day  
Once a year Adyan hosts, what they call a spiritual solidarity day, where different religious affiliations 
can meet and pray together (27:00).  
 
3.3 Non-formal Education for High Schools Kids  
Adyan practices non-formal education for students in high schools. There are 30 schools all over 
Lebanon involved, and the kids learn about “the other” (i.e. from other religions) and about history 
and memory. The high schools are from different regions and the students have different religions, so 
Adyan also arranges for them to meet and visit places in Lebanon together: This year they will even 
do community service together (24:00).   
 
3.4 The Syrian Refugees  
Adyan also works with the Syrian refugees. Both Syrians in Lebanon, but also them still living in 
Syria. Here Adyan draws on the foundation's work and experience, and they provide teaching in peace 
education, reconciliation and psychosocial support. Tabbara argues that it is impossible to rebuild 
Syria if all the ties between the communities are broken, so this is what Adyan tries to prevent. This is 
a lesson Adyan have learnt from the Lebanese civil war. During the war all the communities closed 
upon themselves to protect themselves, but Adyan wants to do what they can, to prevent the Syrians 
to make the same mistakes. It is preparation for after the war (28:00).  
 
4. Methods  
4.1 Reaching the Medium and Top-level 
Adyan cooperates with the state, more specific the Ministry of Education, in their work with the 
curriculum:  
 
“Civil society can do a great deal if it knows how to enter a partnership with the state. We bring the 
funding, because the state does not have the funding, and we bring the ideas and the work. This is 
how civil society can actually affect changes on the long term” (Tabbara 39:00). 
 
Tabbara argues that because the state in Lebanon is weak, it has problems with corruption etc., the 
CSO’s must help the state (40:00). With the Intercultural Citizenship Education it was not hard to 
engage the state (42:00).  
Adyan tries to reach all of the internal actors in Lebanon, but some political  groups as the Salafis and 
Hezbollah, are not interested in dialogue. They are really closed upon themselves and they have their 
own projects. Though sometimes they still wants to see what is going on and then they might come as 
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observers for instance. In that way Adyan can reach them, or else they can try to reach them through 
others that are close to them (14:30).  
 
4.2 Reaching the Arab Region  
Adyan wants to engage more Arabic countries in its work on Intercultural Citizenship Education, and 
teachers from around the region have already visited to learn more about it (25:00). Tabbara argues 
that the Arab spring has shown North Africa and the Middle East that they are all very diverse 
countries, and they need to address this diversity (43:30).  
 
5. Others 
5.1 Long-term Changes  
Tabbara argues that changes come from both bottom-up and top-down approaches, and this is why 
Adyan works with the youth on the grassroots level, but also on an academic level and on a political 
level. 
 
“Adyan try to work with the religious institutions but real change come from the society… There is a 
need for change, and the Muslim youth are waking up today and disagreeing with how things are, so 
we need them to be themselves more empowered, we need them to belief in themselves – and that 
also includes their Islamic background” (34:30).   
 
To obtain long-term changes, there is a need to work with the state:  
“We could not have changed the curriculum in Lebanon, if we had not worked with the government” 
(Nayla Tabbara 46:40).  
It is not Adyan’s role to work with security issues, the geopolitical situation is out of their hands. 
Though, Adyan can work on people’s mentality, their perception, their common vision, and all of this 
is on the path for sustainable peace:  
“You are changing these people, so they might not welcome ISIS for instance, but all of this is long-
term change” (54:20).  
Adyan knows its strengths and weaknesses. For instance in the projects with Syrians, they cannot give 
food, shelter etc., but they can do what they are good (i.e. teaching in peace education, reconciliation 
and psychosocial support) and they have realised that this is highly needed as well. Adyan works with 
the Syrians during a conflict where things are very tense, but they try to get them to meet despite of 
everything else going on (55:00).  
 
6. Challenges  
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For CSO’s it is really difficult to establish sustainable structures, because their work is project based, 
and it can be very difficult to link one project to another. This is also one of the reasons why Adyan 
created the institute. Funding is another recurring problem, but Tabbara explains that what she sees as 
the biggest challenge for Adyan is actually the high demand of their work. Adyan is a small 
organisation and they do not have a lot of employees. The last thing Tabbara mentions as one of the 
biggest challenges is the corruption in Lebanon, i.e. political and religious leaders who are only 
thinking about themselves and how to keep their positions (49:00).   
 
7. Funding 
Adyan do not accept private funding and they do not accept interference in their work from any 
funders and Tabbara explains that this is why Adyan prefers to work with European organisations 
(57:00). Furthermore Adyan has decided that if they believe in something, but do not have the money 
to see it through, they will do it anyway. For instance all the school projects that Adyan has done, was 
to begin with runned by themselves with no costs, because they could not get the founding. For one of 
their first projects they presented seven projects proposals, hoping that someone would fund it, but all 
they got was refusals.  
“So we decided, ok we will do it anyway. So we got people who were volunteers themselves and we 
trained them and then we went, with those volunteers, to the schools and we started working with the 
kids and the schools. The program was so successful that the next year UNESCO wanted to be a 
partner with us and the second year, the American embassy wanted to be partners.” (Tabbara 58:32) 
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Appendix 3 
3. Interview Display: Morgane Ortmans Representing Search for Common Ground  
 
Wednesday the 8th of April at 2 p.m. at her office, Beirut, Lebanon  
Interviewed: Morgane Ortmans, Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator in Search for 
Common Ground,  representing Search for Common Ground  
Interviewers: Luna Mariager, Josefine Jesta Lilja Jensen and Marie Bechgaard  
 
1. Introduction  
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is an international NGO started in 1982 by American John 
Marks. Its first headquarter was in Washington, but today it has spread to 30 countries. SFCG started 
to work in Lebanon in 1996 and opened up a permanent office in 2008. The office in Lebanon 
addresses conflicts arising within Lebanon’s already diverse society, tensions resulting from the 
increasing influx of Syrian refugees, security sector reform, and women’s socio-economic 
empowerment. For each issue, they seek to engage all stakeholders and strengthen local capacities in 
order to create sustainable change and increased social cohesion (SFCG 14.05.2015). 
 
2. Main Objectives  
At this moment Search for Common Ground focus all of its work on the Syrian crisis. This means that 
SFCG works with creating social stability between the Syrians and the Lebanese. The main idea is to 
bring people together, who would not usually talk with each other (15:00). Ortmans explains that most 
projects on peacebuilding in Lebanon are focused mainly on the Lebanese, but this is where SFCG is 
different, because they mostly do projects on Syrian-Lebanese relations. (04:00). 
 
3. Projects 
3.1 Social Stability 
SFCG used to work with social cohesion, but Ortmans argues that they cannot talk about cohesion in 
the current situation. This is mostly because of political and historical issues. The state does not want 
to encourage the Syrian refugees to stay, why cohesion gives the wrong impression. She argues that it 
is better to talk about stability, because it implies that the situation is only temporary. SFCG is a part 
of the core group for school social cohesion, in a program called Social Stability. The group is co-lead 
by the Ministry Of Social Affairs. Ortmans argues that to tackle the Syrian crises a change is needed 
from a humanitarian assistance approach, to a more developmental approach. The developmental 
approach is able to tackle not only the current emergency, but also the long-term aspects of the crises 
(2:00). 
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“So when we talk about social stability, it is more on a developmental level, that should benefit 
mainly the Lebanese, but also taking into consideration the refugee situation, to avoid increasing 
tensions” (Ortmans 3:00)  
 
3.2 Better Together  
This program is about bringing the Lebanese and the Syrian youth together on artistic creation so that 
they can get to know each other and create something together. They all spend one week on a summer 
camp and here they are introduced to theatre, drawing, video etc. By the end of the summer, they have 
to choose an art form they want to continue working with, and for the rest of the year they produce 
something in this art form. This programme gives them a possibility to express themselves through 
art. Many of the young people from Syria have been traumatized by the war in Syria, and some of the 
Lebanese children have had traumatizing experiences growing up. In the project they can share these 
memories and discover that they have something in common (6:30).  
 
3.3 Dialogue Project in Beirut 
This project is a part of the “Security Sector Reform” and in the project SFCG works on community 
policing in a neighbourhood in Beirut. SFCG works with bringing the police and the youth together 
and creating a feeling of trust, but also to make them realise that security is everyone’s responsibility 
(30:00). 
3.4 The Empowerment of Women 
In this project SFCG brings Lebanese CSO’s that work with women’s rights together, to work on 
advocacy and to make them realise, that they might be stronger and more successful in reaching their 
goals, if they cooperate (36:00) .  
 
3.5 Videogame 
SCG has, together with professionals, developed a videogame, where the players need to negotiate 
and use dialogue, instead of violence, to solve conflicts (57:00).  
 
4. Methods 
4.1 Reaching the Medium and Top-level  
The state is neither willing nor able to tackle the refugee crises. They do not want to acknowledge the 
need for building refugee camps, though they cannot completely ignore 2 mio. refugees. SFCG tries 
to engage the political leaders on a municipal level and involve them in their projects (25:20). Though 
sometimes SFCG also have to be aware that they municipal leaders might want to highjack the 
projects. Ortmans argues that because the municipalities do not get the proper funding from the state, 
the economy is often really bad in the and some places they do not want to recognize the problem of 
the Syrian refugees, and the need to tackle Syrian-Lebanese relations (26:00). The municipalities have 
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bigger issues that they prefer to deal with first; for instance in Tripoli, the municipal leaders claim that 
the amount of garbage has tripled with the Syrian refugees, and they want SFCG to help them fix that. 
Based on a participatory process, in which the municipality leaders involved the citizens, they asked 
SFCG for a truck to collect the garbage. SFCG donated money for the truck and Ortmans says that 
these small things is something that SFCG can actually help with, even though SFCG is not a 
humanitarian development organisation (27:00). But it is very important for Ortmans to stress that it is 
not SFCG’s job to provide services, but to provide a space where the municipal leaders or the citizens 
can meet and together design the solutions to the many problems. In the Tripoli case they all agreed 
that one of the solutions to their problems was the garbage truck and in that case SFCG is willingly to 
provide the truck (28:00). Ortmans explains that SFCG can do small things if it can help SFCG with 
reaching their main goal, which is to create a space for Syrian refugees and Lebanese citizens to meet 
and to start a dialogue with each other (25:00). “Ideally it is one of our main objectives to strengthen 
the cooperation with the local level and the capacities to deal with the crises” (Ortmans 28:30).  
SFCG implements all their projects with local partners (13:00), but sometimes it can be a problem, 
that SFCG is an American organisation, and do have American funding. Especially in South of 
Lebanon (Muslim areas), SFCG sometimes experience that the local organisations do not want to 
work with them.  
 
4.2 Monitoring 
Ortmans explains how SFCG have done different monitoring reports on Syrian-Lebanese relations. 
Last year they did a conflict scan on the Lebanese perception of Syrians, to break down the barriers 
between the Syrians and the Lebanese. Ortmans argues that many Lebanese are unbounded in their 
fear for the Syrian refugees. For instance they claim that the Syrians take their jobs, but in the conflict 
scan SFCG found that relatively few Lebanese could provide actual examples of situations in which 
Syrians had taken their jobs. Ortmans do on the other hand argue that this might be changing now that 
the economy is getting worse. Before the Syrians used to do take the jobs that the Lebanese did not 
want themselves, but more and more impoverished Lebanese are now starting to look for these jobs 
themselves (10:20). 
 
SFCG also uses other NGOs monitoring reports, for example Human Rights Watch, as the basis for 
some of their projects on promoting social stability between Syrians and Lebanese (09:45) 
 
4.3 Facilitating Space  
All of SFCG’s projects are based on the same strategy: to facilitate a place for dialogue, where 
different groups can meet and start working together on the solution to their problems. Ortmans 
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explains that SFCG only facilitates and provide safe places for the different groups to meet. Ortmans 
explains that facilitating the space for dialogue, is SFCG’s approach to peacebuilding (32:40).  
 
4.4 Know-how  
SFCG, as an international organisation, can use its know-how from other conflicts, in other countries 
(14:00). SFCG works in over 30 countries and has gained unique experience from all the countries. 
Ortmans explains that SFCG uses this experience when forming new projects, and then in cooperation 
with local organisations, reformulate the projects to the local context (47:30).  
 
5. Others 
5.1 The Syrian Crisis 
Ortmans argues that the Syrian crisis is a very pressing issue, and that peace building is highly 
needed. Ortmans argues, that peacebuilding always comes too late when there is a conflict. In the 
early phases of conflict there is only humanitarian aid, which is of cause also highly needed, but if 
peacebuilding were addressed earlier in the process, the post-conflict situation would be easier 
(47:00). Ortmans gives the example that many poor Lebanese see all the aid that Syrian refugees get, 
and wonder why they are not getting any, because they feel, that they are in the same situation 
(48:20). There is a general pressure on all resources and the less privileged Lebanese, will feel it more 
than the privileged (11:00). Tensions between the Syrian refugees and the Lebanese population are 
rising, and this fuels the general anti-Syrian perception in some parts of the Lebanese population 
(10:00). Ortmans argue that it is really difficult to work only on Lebanese-Lebanese issues today, 
because the Syrian crisis has such a big impact on the country. Today working with Syrian-Lebanese 
issues are highly needed, but it is closely interrelated with the Lebanese development project in 
general (37:00).  
 
6. Challenges  
6.1 Effectiveness of the CSO’s and Competition  
Ortmans argues that there is a big problem in coordinating between the different CSO’s. Sometimes 
SFCG experience that there are too many actors in one project and this confuses the situation even 
more. This sometimes result in low efficiency because the organisations tend to work on the same 
issues (22:00). The state should be able to coordinate their work , but they can’t (24:00). There is no 
one, who takes the lead; everyone is doing their own mapping and their own assessment (17:00). 
There is also a lot of competition between the different CSOs: for the funding, for the visibility etc., 
and also the organizations tend to choose the same geographical areas to work in (18:00). Ortmans 
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explains that a lot of time is spent on preparing projects and building a trustful relationship with 
SFCG’s partners, and sometimes they have to realise that their plans are not working (15:30).  
 
6.2 System Challenges  
Ortmans explains that the sectarian system is a huge problem in both the political system, but also in 
the civil society. Even if SFCG manage to bring different factions together and make them realise 
they have common interests, they always withdraw back to their own community and sect (36:00) 
“This is a big issue in Lebanon, and I do not see it changing anytime soon, because you have a lack of 
political lead, and even on the political level, they want to keep their own privileges” (Ortmans 
36:40). 
Ortmans explains that this problem is obvious with the current political situation.  
“Most Lebanese people are totally disengaged from the political life, since the civil war it is still the 
same people in power, so if you are on a good socio-economic level, you live your own life or you 
just leave the country, and then you just have the poor people that are staying” (Morgane Ortmans 
42:40). 
 
7. Funding 
As SFCG is an international organisation it is funded by various different partners both foundations 
and non-profit organisations, governments and multilateral institutions (SFCG 14.05.2015).  
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Appendix 4 
4. Interview Display: Muhammad Al-Sammak Representing the Christian-Muslim 
Committee for Dialogue (CMCD) 
 
Interviewed: Muhammad Al-Sammak. Secretary General of Christian-Muslim Committee for 
Dialogue in Lebanon (CMCD)  
Interviewers: Marie Bechgaard Madsen, Josefine Jesta Lilja Jensen & Luna Mariager 
Thursday the 2th of April 2015 at 11 a.m. at his office in Beirut, Lebanon. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Christian-Muslim Committee for Dialogue (CMCD) is a CSO with members from different 
religious groups. The members are appointed directly by the highest authority of their respective 
religious community, whom they represent and to whom they report to. CMCD meets on a regular 
basis in order to deal with issues related to the Islamic-Christian Dialogue. Furthermore they keep 
their meetings open in order to follow-up on the need for specific actions in emergency situations. 
CMCD works for engaging all Lebanese in dialogue about current issues. The dialogue should 
strengthen the course of national reconciliation, and remove reasons for feelings of grievance from all 
parties, as well as strengthen the foundation and basis of a national entente. Furthermore, CMCD 
work to become a national institution who created a permanent dialogue between the state and the 
people, and between the different religious communities by organizing seminars and holding joint 
conferences, as well as through the media (Chrislam.org, 08.05.2015). 
 
2. Main Objectives 
Muhammad Al-Sammak does not like the system of confessionalism – but instead looks for complete 
freedom, complete equality, and complete citizenship. That is why the good citizenship is of great 
importance (10:30). According to teachings of the Koran, Muslims have to respect Christianity as 
well as preserve and protect Christians and their Churches. Al Sammak argues, that it is needed for 
these teachings to be better known by Christians, in order to create a more peaceful future (19:00). 
When bringing the religious leaders together, they can at least send a message about working together 
and that it is needed to tackle phenomenons as terrorism and extremism together, because the future is 
together. Not only for the sake of Lebanon, but also for the sake of the whole of Middle East (35:20). 
Al-Sammak argues, that reconciliation is an ever-continuous process, and something that needs to 
require attention. There has been progress in the reconciliation process, for instance it is no longer a 
taboo for Muslims to enter Christian schools (42:15).  
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“That’s why we, as Muslims, are against the migration of Christians; we cannot imagine a Middle 
East without the Christians – that is not the Middle East anymore. We cannot imagine Lebanon 
without the Christians, what would it become?” (ID4 2: Al-Sammak: 51:00). 
 
3. Projects 
3.1 Religious Summit 
CMCD facilitates meetings between 18 religious leaders – 14 Christian and 4 Muslim communities. 
They meet, and decide to make a general statement on behalf of them all. This is formulated by Al-
Sammak, representation CMCD. In this statement they mention many different issues about living 
together in Lebanon e.g. about refusing extremism in the Middle East and in Lebanon (22:00). The 
content of the latest statement is among other things: lack of a president, economic and social 
problems, Syrian migrants and terror. (28:45) 
 
3.2 Annunciation Day/Feast 
The 25th of March used to be an only Christian holiday. This date marks the annunciation day, which 
celebrates Virgin Mary. Virgin Mary is also part of Islamic beliefs and therefore CMCD pushed the 
government to make this day a Christian-Muslim holiday, and they succeeded. Lebanon is the first 
country, where the Annunciation Day is both a Christian and a Muslim holiday – and where all 
papers, all offices, even governmental offices, and all schools are closed. As Al-Sammak puts it: 
“This is something that really shows that we are living together and are trying to build bridges.” (ID 4, 
3.2: Al-Sammak: 24:30) 
 
 
3.3 Youth Dialogue 
CMCD also work with dialogue, and has brought young Assyrians from Christian schools to spend a 
day in a Muslim School. For many Assyrians, this was the first time they came to a Muslim area. The 
two groups stayed the whole day in the same classroom, they had lunch together and they went to the 
mosque together. The following week the young Muslims went to the Christian’s school and did the 
same. Al-Sammak argues, that CMCD was afraid that the first contact could have created some 
friction, but this did not happen. What Al-Sammak highlights as especially great about this project, 
was not the meetings itself, but that it created the foundation for meetings between the families later 
on, without the CMCD’s intervention. So the first meeting created a spill-over effect. (39:30) 
 
4. Methods 
4.1 Reaching the Medium and Top-level  
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CMCD works mostly with the leaders of the community, the religious leaders, but the organisation is 
also accepted by the government. It is not a NGO and it is not a governmental body, but is accepted 
by the government, as a representative committee for the eighteen religious communities of Lebanon 
(28:00). The committee works with bringing both the youth and the civil society in general together. 
They do this through universities, culture, books, lectures and activities (38:45). 
 
5. Others 
5.1 The Society 
There have been differences socially between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. Christians were 
better educated, and thereby in a better position - also economically. But things are changing, 
Muslims are doing much better than before and they have, through education, improved their social 
standard. They have through migration been in contact with different lifestyles, different education, 
and that has not only improved their income, but it has also given them a better understanding of life 
and living with “the other”(45:30) . Al-Sammak: “This has been changing Lebanon, so the social 
differences between Christians and Muslims are still there, but it is much less than it was before” (ID 
3 5.1, Al-Sammak: 45:30). 
 
5.2 The State 
Sammak argues, that Lebanon has a democracy, though not a perfect democracy. Not democracy as 
defined in your textbooks, because it is multi seating democracy, but the good thing about this kind of 
democracy is that it preserves the national unity of Lebanon. The sectarian democracy is not imposed, 
it is agreed upon all confessions of Lebanon. Al-Sammak argues, that it keeps national unity under 
control, and all Christians and Muslims from different denominations, find themselves in one way or 
the other within the system. “So we don’t say that democracy in Lebanon is perfect, but there is 
something democratic, which you do not find in any other country in the Middle East” (ID 4 5.2. Al-
Sammak: 07:40). He furthermore argues that the state is not doing enough to promote coexistence. 
Since the civil war Lebanon has been subjected to displacements according to religious affiliation. 
The displacements and separation remained for 16-17 years and there has not been a re-bridging and 
regrouping. Al-Sammak explains, that the young people, whether on the Muslim side or the Christian 
side, have grown up completely separated from the other in all aspects of Lebanese society: in 
schools, in the market, in family affairs and in social relations. Al-Sammak argues that the 
government did not do enough to create bridging between the communities after the civil war. He 
argues that it was mostly because of laziness and misunderstanding. “We need to be re-grouped by 
education and this is the responsibility of the government that they did not do” (ID 3, 4.2, Al-
Sammak: 37:30) 
 
5.3 The Region 
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Even though the Syrians withdraw in 2005 there is still many pro-Syria parties in Lebanon. Al-
Sammak explains, that this is not only Hezbollah, but also other political parties, leaders and 
personalities, who have a mutual interest in Syria. So Lebanon is still a part of everything that is 
happening in Syria and Syria still has some influence in Lebanon – through Hezbollah mainly, and 
those who are cooperating with Hezbollah (21:30). 
 
6. Challenges  
Al-Sammak explains that there is a lot of extremism in the Middle East right now, and that it is in the 
interests of Muslims in general first and foremost to face the situation, and prevent them from gaining 
control in the Middle East, but also to avoid misinterpretation of the Islamic religion and 
misunderstanding of Islam. The only way to face the situation, Al-Sammak argues, is for Muslim 
scholars to raise their voice and say “this is wrong”, and second for Christians and Muslims to 
cooperate in facing this phenomenon. Al-Sammak argues that the cooperation is very unique and 
strange in the history of the region (15:23). 
Lebanon is situated in a part of the world, where extremism is a part of life. The Middle East is the 
hub of all civilisations, of all religions and of many ethnicities. Al-Sammak argues that this is an 
important factor to take into consideration when looking at prosperity for peacebuilding in Lebanon 
(47:50). 
 
7. Funding 
No information on this 
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Appendix 5 
5. Interview Display: Christina Foerch Representing Permanent Peace Movement and 
Fighters for Peace  
 
Interviewed: Christina Foerch, journalist and documentarist 
Interviewers: Luna Mariager, Josefine Jesta Lilja Jensen og Marie Bechgaard Madsen 
Wednesday the 8th of April at 10.00 am. at Starbucks Beirut Souk, Beirut, Lebanon  
The interview is, because of technical problems, done in three parts. We will refer to these as I1, I2 
and I3.  
 
1. Introduction 
Christina Foerch is a German journalist and documentary filmmaker, who came to Lebanon 15 years 
ago. She has worked with Permanent Peace Movement and today she works with Fighters for Peace.  
 
Permanent Peace Movement 
Permanent Peace Movement (PPM) is an independent non-governmental organisation (NGO) founded 
in 1986, during the Lebanese civil war, by a group of university students. PPM works to promote 
peace throughout the MENA region (Permanent Peace Movement 18.05.2015). PPM works on 
building peace in the local, national and international communities through spreading the culture of 
peace and transforming/preventing conflicts. It also strives to empower individuals and institutions 
enabling them to play their respective roles in this field. 
 
Fighters for Peace 
Fighters for Peace is an organisation that works with x-fighters who fought during the civil war. The 
organisation tries to promote and tell the x-fighter’s stories to openly address the past and prevent 
future violent conflicts (I2: 00:40). 
 
2. Main Objectives 
Foerch argues that there is a need for change in the state of mind, culture, and the political system in 
Lebanon. The divides of religion, political affiliation and geography in the society go through the civil 
society, but also through the political system. Foerch argues that so far, there has mainly been a 
change in the civil society, but there is a need for change on every level of the society (I3: 02:48). 
Foerch explains that the change of mentality has to come first, and then you are able to implement a 
different system (I3: 06:30). One of the main objectives of Foerch’s projects are to bring people 
 84 
together, to communicate and enter into dialogue, and thereby learn how to deal with conflict. Foerch 
argues that conflicts are a part of life, so people need the skills to tackle them. 
 
3. Projects 
3.1 Memory and Reconciliation 
Together with her husband, who a child soldier during the Lebanese civil war, Foerch started a project 
under the PPM called “Memory and Reconciliation”. The project targeted youth from 14 to 20 years 
old, from mainly public schools. Foerch explains that this group was chosen because they came from 
weaker economic backgrounds and therefore were easier targeted and manipulated by political parties 
and leaders.  
 
“Our main target were youth aged between 14-20 years old… In this age between 14-20, 25 even, 
most youth do not have families of their own, they do not have any responsibilities except for 
themselves, they are very idealistic, it is quite easy to manipulate their minds. Besides that my 
Husband, used to be a fighter in the Lebanese Civil war and he started at the age of 14” (I1: Foerch: 
04:40). 
 
The project was centred around filmmaking on the memories of the civil war in Lebanon. The 
Memory and Reconciliation project went on for six years until there was no more funding. 
 
3.2 Fighters for Peace (I2: 00:40) 
The goal of the Fighters for Peace project is to process, talk and reflect on what happened during the 
war. The x-fighters tour schools, attend meetings with politicians and try to engage people in 
dialogue. 
 
3.3 A curriculum on Peace building 
Changing the curriculum to involve peacebuilding, with other NGOs working on peacebuilding (I3 
21:30). They did not succeed with this.  
 
3.4 Summer Camps for Youth From Different Regions 
 
4. Methods  
4.1 Filmmaking 
Foerch has used filmmaking as a tool to catch the interest of the youth. The objective was to inspire 
the youth to do research on certain events or persons from the civil war. Foerch argues that the 
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filmmaking is not only a learning process of producing films, but also a tool for reflection both for the 
youth and later for x-fighters (I2: 00:40). 
 
4.2 Reaching the Medium and Top-level 
Foerch explains that the goal of the projects that she works on is to reach the medium level, for 
example to reach the fighters who are fighting in Tripoli right now. She argues that they can draw on 
their experience from the civil war, to advocacy for violence not being the solution. The x-fighters 
reached both politicians and the media, but many of Foerch’s other projects did not manage to reach 
the medium level (I3: 33:00). Foerch argues that to make changes on the system level, you need to 
involve state actors (I3: 35:15).  
 
“It has to involve state actors, or it will not work […]. This is probably person to person lobbying that 
you have to do” (I3: Foerch: 35:15).  
 
4.3 Reaching the Media 
Foerch explains that with her different project, she tries to reach the media, but that they don’t give 
the area of memory and reconciliation enough attention. Thus in one project, the students who 
participated had success with reaching the media. The students went to the TV-channels on 14th of 
April to discuss the 14th of April, but also to engage in a discussion on why the journalists did not 
report more on positive things  as for example peacebuilding initiatives. Foerch explains that this was 
aired on all TV-stations except the two religious ones (I3: 42:00). 
 
5. Others 
5.1 Personal Experience With Reconciliation 
Foerch has a personal relation to memory and reconciliation. 
“In Germany in our history classes we learned about 1st and 2nd world war, about our responsibility 
etc., when I came here I realised that nothing of this was going on, the Lebanese history classes 
basically stopped with the war of independence, they don’t tackle anything of the civil war, all that the 
students know is from their parents and this is usually is very biased” (I2: Foerch: 00:20). 
Foerch argues that it was one of the reasons why she started working with Lebanese CSOs. 
 
5.2 Relation to Religion 
Foerch explains that all the projects are focused on reconciliation and memory with a holistic view of 
what happened, not only focused on religion but also capturing different aspects of the war. 
 
5.3 Opportunities for CSOs 
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“The advantage is that the state in Lebanon is weak, this is an advantage for civil society, 
disadvantage for many other things. But for the freedom of action by the civil society the state 
weakness is an advantage. I think it is the only country in the Middle East where you can do this as a 
civil society” (I3: Foerch: 09:00). 
The country is very complex and very fragile. The system guarantees a kind of stability (I3: 07:00). 
Foerch hopes that the CSOs can make a change. Violent change didn’t work, it only led to more 
destruction and deaths. The x-fighters learned their lesson the hard way. Foerch argues that everyone 
has individual views of how things should be, so maybe you first have to find the minimum common 
denominator (I3: 07:20). 
 
6. Challenges 
6.1 Education on the Civil War 
Foerch argues that one of the main challenges for peacebuilding is that there is no education on the 
civil war in schools, and that this is why circles of violence can continue, or why people feared that 
they would repeat as in 2008.   
“Officially it has not changed, but in 2008-09 there were only two organisations addressing these 
issues about memory and reconciliation, now you have many organizations, and universities. We also 
created a curriculum on memory, there are now more initiatives, of cause there are not enough, and 
this is a movement that has remained in the civil society, it has not passed on the political level, on the 
political level nothing has changed” (I2: Foerch: 09:00). 
“This is really what needs to change, even though we reached 22-23.000 students, we did not manage 
to reach the politicians, though sometimes political parties invite us to talk about our project, but we 
haven’t really been able to initiate a change on the political level, so this is really what is missing” (I2: 
Foerch: 9:30). 
 
6.2 System Challenges – Changing the System or the Mentality? 
“Everyone wants to have a normal life, and sustain a normal life. The problem in Lebanon is, that 
everyone in Lebanon criticises the political system, but when it comes to the elections, they all vote 
for them, because they think that the confessional leaders and clan leaders will protect their families 
and communities” (I3: Foerch: 04:00).  
 
Foerch argues that the core problem in Lebanon is the absence of a civilian or non-sectarian state, but 
also a problem of mentality, because the system has always been confessional. Foerch argues that 
there is a great need to work for change also on the system level, but that it is something that may take 
another 100 years (I3: 05:47). 
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“This system bears the roots of conflict in the system. We don’t think that changing the system will 
rip up old wounds, on the contrary. If you manage to implement a civilian state, a non-sectarian state, 
this should actually be the basis for sustainable peace” (I3: Foerch: 05:30). 
For Foerch a change from the outside is a possibility, because so many Lebanese live abroad and have 
experienced other systems, bringing this mentality-change to Lebanon, can maybe change something 
(I3: 04:55). 
 
6.3 Corruption in the Civil Society and State 
Foerch argues that there is corruption everywhere in Lebanon, also in the CSOs (I3: 10:40). 
“There was a big project in the Ministry of Education to change the curriculum, supported by the EU, 
but in the end the EU stopped their support, the money disappeared and nothing happened, nothing 
happened at all” (I3: Foerch: 10:40). 
Foerch argues that transparency is a key tool in fighting corruption, and that they try to be as 
transparent as possible, making monthly reports and finance reports. But if you want to be corrupt, 
there is always a way. But compared to the corruption happening on the government level, the 
corruption in the CSOs is minimal. For CSOs it can be a strategy of survival (I3: 11:20). 
Foerch argues that they work around the system, but the system is driven by money. Foerch argues 
that money is crucial for the success of her different projects, and to reach changes with the projects, 
you have to have the finances to do it (I3:03:21). 
 
6.4 The Sectarianism in the Civil Society (I3: 12:20) 
Foerch argues, that because the state is so weak the civil society has to take over some of the 
functions of the state: Medical care, care for the elderly and handicapped etc. Lebanon has religious 
foundations that take on this role, for example the René Moawad Foundation, a Christian political 
charity foundation, or the Hariri foundation, which is a Sunni-Muslim charity organisation, that for 
example provides medical care and sponsor student. This is how they secure and maintain their 
communities support. Because the state is absent, there is a need and a possibility for CSOs to provide 
services, but they are as biased when providing these services as when it comes to political issues.  
 
6.5. Effectiveness of CSOs and Competition (I3: 17:50): 
Foerch says that the Lebanese civil society might not be very effective, but that measuring 
effectiveness is a sum of a lot of different things coming together. 
Foerch explains that competition is an obstacle for having an effective civil society. It is mainly a 
problem of funding, and the competition for these funds. The competition is evident, when for 
example different organisations copy each other’s programs and approach each others schools, 
because it is easier to use the same, than to lay the groundwork and approach for new ones. Foerch 
argues, that on one hand the competition and copying of each others programs is problematic, but in 
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the end, if you reach the change it does not matter how. Another example is a conference with all the 
Lebanese NGOs working on peacebuilding to make a change in curriculum to involve peacebuilding 
(I3: 21:30). One NGO went on their own, without telling anyone and made the curriculum without the 
others. Foerch argues that every organisation has its specialisation and if they all come together and 
supplement each other, it is easier to reach the same goal. 
 
6.6 The Challenge of Reach 
Foerch explains that it is always a challenge for CSOs to reach everyone. Foerch explains that PPM 
has tried to be active all over the country and deliberately have not only tried to involve the privileged 
young Christians or Muslims, but all groups of society. Foerch argues that one of the main challenges 
for peacebuilding is, that there is always a need for more initiatives and programs (I3: 3:21). 
 
6.7 More Potential for Conflict (I3: 45:40) 
Foerch argues that there is more potential for conflict now, than when the civil war started, because 
the country is more sectarian and confessional now. This has to do with regional and global politics. 
After the Hariri assassination the situation changed to a more Sunni-Shia conflict, and Lebanon 
became more sectarian. 
But there are three main differences from then till now (I3: 46:50): 
1) In 1975 there was a cold war and satellite states. Lebanon was one of these satellite states that the 
superpowers tried to influence the country.  
2) There wasn’t a real civil society then, but there is now. People are more aware of what is going on 
in the country. They are working against, protesting and speaking up about what is happening on the 
political level. People today are not afraid to speak up. 
3) The third reason is that the Lebanese people have already learned their lesson. The people who 
lived during the war are still alive, and can pass on their stories and experiences. Foerch argues that 
the politicians want to maintain the system and are not interested in another war. 
Hezbollah today have all the weapons, as the Palestinians did in 1975. But Foerch argues that they 
probably have realized from their experience in 2008 that they cannot win. Not even militarily (I3: 
48:90). 
 
7. Funding (I1: 07:10) 
The Memory and Reconciliation project was funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a the 
Lebanese Ministry of Education and the Ministry for Displaced People, Foerch argues that it is the 
only ministry that kind of handled the post-conflict situation. 
 
